A report on assistance from the Soviet Union and East Germany to North Korea's intelligence services.

This speech by East German Minister of State Security Mielke is about technological, intellectual, and ideological preparations for war by the west and how to uncover and organize indicators of a potential attack.

This report by Ministry of State Security describes developments and achievements toward early recognition of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR (Complex RYAN).

This document is a plan for the consultations to take place in Berlin between the Stasi and the KBG. It includes objectives and proposed theses on the subject of early recognition of a sudden nuclear missile attack by the adversary.

This letter by KGB Chairman Chebrikov responds to an earlier letter sent by East German Minister for State Security Mielke. In it, Chebrikov agrees to the proposed meeting between the MfS and the KGB on the subject of a sudden nuclear missile attack on the states of the socialist community.

This report describes conversations with Comrade Kryuchkov, coving a multitude of subjects, but delving briefly into the problem of "prevention of a surprise nuclear attack" (RYAN). Kryuchkov responded that this issue is being continually worked on, but no central decisions had been made as of yet.

This note on the talks between Minister Wolf and KGB Chairman Chebrikov contains heartfelt congratulations on cooperation thus far, but it also highlights problems with the situation and the importance of utilizing the potential of all fraternal organs to detect and prevent hostile plans and measures.

This brief note written by the Ministry of State Security includes a number of questions for the leadership of the KGB in the USSR, such as whether other elements, like military doctrine or emergency responses, should be examined as possible options for starting a war.

Recommendations adopted by the National Security Council at the suggestion of the Psychological Strategy Board on covert actions to be undertaken in the Soviet Satellite States. Authorized by the National Security Council, NSC 158 envisaged aggressive psychological warfare to exploit and heighten the unrest behind the Iron Curtain. The policy was endorsed by President Eisenhower on June 26, 1953.

Meeting between the head of the KGB’s Fifth Chief Directorate, Major General Abramov, and Minister for State Security Mielke, especially on changes in Soviet policy following Mikhail Gorbachev’s accession to power. They discuss the increase in dissident activity, public demonstrations, and subversive organizations.