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August 2, 1991

National Intelligence Daily for Friday, 2 August 1991

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 2 August 1991 describes the latest developments in Iraq, Kuwait, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Lebanon, France, the European Community and Brazil.

December 29, 1989

National Intelligence Daily for Friday, 29 December 1989

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 29 December 1989 describes the latest developments in Panama, Romania, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Brazil, Lebanon, Chile, and Poland.

September 29, 1989

National Intelligence Daily for Friday, 29 September 1989

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 29 September 1989 describes the latest developments in China, Tunisia, the Soviet Union, Ecuador, Peru, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Philippines, Indonesia, Iran, and Brazil.

October 30, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

Fidel Castro, after his first contacts with Brazilian President João Goulart’s special envoy Albino Silva, accepted well the Brazilian thesis which contains following: Denuclearization of the whole of Latin America and the embargo on atomic weapons delivery; Inspection by UN; Cuba would commit neither to export revolution nor to carry out any subversive activities; Cuba would be given guarantees for keeping its sovereignty and independence. The USA will accept the plan after negotiations. Russians “couldn’t think of anything better.”

October 24, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

A telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry discussing the Cuban Missile Crisis and U.S.-USSR-Cuban relations. It says, the "American arguments in favor of the military blockade of Cuba are: firstly, they have solid proof that Cuba will get atomic weapons; secondly, Kennedy must take more severe measures because of the internal pressure, that’s why his option is blockade, although he is trying to transfer this issue to the UNO [United Nations Organization] in order to alleviate the pressure on himself; thirdly, transferring Cuba’s issue to the UNO he is creating a precedent against unilateral USSR actions in Berlin."