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September 30, 1989

National Intelligence Daily for Saturday, 30 September 1989

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 30 September 1989, describes the latest developments in Lebanon, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, Philippines, the United States, Greece, Hungary, El Salvador, Panama, Thailand, and Nicaragua.

May 18, 1989

National Intelligence Daily for Thursday, 18 May 1989

The CIA's National Intelligence Daily for 18 May 1989 describes the latest developments in China, the Soviet Union, Ethiopia, Panama, El salvador, Venezuela, West Germany, Bolivia, Poland, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Philippines.

April 9, 1968

Excerpts from Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev’s speech at the April 1968 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party

Brezhnev discusses negotiations with the United States over the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

February 21, 1990

Assessment by the Austrian Foreign Ministry, 'Question of German Unity (State of affairs, February 1990)'

The assessment by the Austrian Foreign Ministry of German Unity is broken into five subject areas. The first part concerns the responsibility of the Four Powers to a new unified Germany. Next, West Germany's commitment to German unity dating as far back as 1970. The third portion outlines the border and security concerns of East and West Germany, as well as the Soviet Union, United States, Great Britain, and France. The next part is focused on economic recovery, specifically the lack of certain goods in East Germany (ie cars and houses). Finally, the report addresses the future developments of a unified Germany with an emphasis on the security of nearby states.

December 10, 1957

Letter, Nikolai Bulganin to Dwight D. Eisenhower

Bulganin proposes a halt on nuclear tests among the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom beginning on January 1, 1958.

October 13, 1965

Research Memorandum RSB-115 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Soviet Views of Nuclear Sharing and Nonproliferation'

INR looked closely at Soviet positions on an NPT arguing that the Soviets appeared to “attach a higher priority in using the nondissemination issue as a means of attacking possible NATO nuclear arrangements than in concluding an agreement.”

September 29, 1965

Research Memorandum RSB-106 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Soviet Conditions about Western Nuclear Arrangements for a Nondissemination Treaty'

INR looked closely at Soviet positions on an NPT arguing that the Soviets appeared to “attach a higher priority in using the nondissemination issue as a means of attacking possible NATO nuclear arrangements than in concluding an agreement.”

December 30, 1964

Intelligence Note from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Soviet Interest in a West German Commitment Not To Manufacture Nuclear Weapons'

INR estimated that the Soviets wanted to “play upon French concern” that West Germany might acquire nuclear weapons through new NATO nuclear arrangements, such as the MLF.

September 4, 1962

Research Memorandum RSB-152 from Roger Hilsman to the Secretary, 'Soviet Tactics in Talks on the Non-Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons'

Before the words “nuclear nonproliferation” entered official discourse, the term “non-diffusion” (or “non-dissemination”) of nuclear weapons was used routinely. In part stemming from the negotiations over Berlin, during 1962-1963 the Kennedy administration held talks with allies and adversaries on the possibility of a non-diffusion agreement which included Germany. In light of a recent Soviet proposal, INR veteran Soviet expert Sonnenfeldt explained why Moscow had moved away from earlier proposals singling out West Germany and was focusing on the general applicability of a non-diffusion agreement.

February 21, 1962

Research Memorandum RSB-58 from Roger Hilsman to the Secretary, 'Probable Soviet Reaction to Establishment of Multilateral NATO-Controlled MRBM Force'

As discussion of a NATO multilateral force (MLF) unfolded, unfolded, one question which had to be addressed was how the Soviet Union would respond to the creation of such a NATO force. Because a NATO force would increase Western military capabilities, Soviet opposition was assumed.

Pagination