Fidel Castro, after his first contacts with Brazilian President João Goulart’s special envoy Albino Silva, accepted well the Brazilian thesis which contains following: Denuclearization of the whole of Latin America and the embargo on atomic weapons delivery; Inspection by UN; Cuba would commit neither to export revolution nor to carry out any subversive activities; Cuba would be given guarantees for keeping its sovereignty and independence. The USA will accept the plan after negotiations. Russians “couldn’t think of anything better.”

A telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry discussing the Cuban Missile Crisis and U.S.-USSR-Cuban relations. It says, the "American arguments in favor of the military blockade of Cuba are: firstly, they have solid proof that Cuba will get atomic weapons; secondly, Kennedy must take more severe measures because of the internal pressure, that’s why his option is blockade, although he is trying to transfer this issue to the UNO [United Nations Organization] in order to alleviate the pressure on himself; thirdly, transferring Cuba’s issue to the UNO he is creating a precedent against unilateral USSR actions in Berlin."

A report from Roberto de Oliveira Campos on how certain actions and diplomatic moves during the Cuban crisis have served to inflame international tensions on both sides.

In conversation with a high officials from the State Department about the prospects of the Cuban situation, three hypotheses about the future Soviet comportment are discussed: 1) abandon entirely the government of Fidel Castro to its own fate; 2) limit itself to leave constituted in Cuba a socialist regime, based on a well-structured communist party and endowed with a repressive political machine, as a political base of propaganda and infiltration in Latin America and 3) to intensify Soviet technical and economic assistance in a manner to transform Cuba into a living demonstration of the efficacy of communism as an instrument of economic development in Latin America. The letter goes on to describe these three points in more detail.

Mello-Franco discusses a conversation he had with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov. According to Kuznetsov, the American insistence on the question of inspection is becoming moot [ociosa] since the United States has declared satisfaction with the removal of offensive material existing in Cuba, it is only a pretext to postpone indefinitely the commitment of non-invasion and suspension of the economic blockade against Cuba.

Pinto describes a meeting with Roa in which Roa repeats a message from Fidel Castro's proclamation that the evacuation of the American base Guantanamo should be directed at not only the United States, but also the Soviet Union, to show both that Cuba is not a toy of the great powers and should be heard in the coming negotiations.

Campos discusses agreements that are being made between Kennedy and Khrushchev regarding the immediate dismantling of the missile bases in Cuba, international inspections of Cuba, and an abandonment of the demand for reciprocity in Turkey.

Campos discusses the brief alleviation in tensions between the United States and Soviet Union over the Cuban issue due to a temporary accord for a limited-diversion of the Soviet ships.

The Brazilian Delegation to the OAS reports that the American Delegation at the General Assembly of the United Nations will enter into contact with the Brazilian Delegation to examine the proposal for banning nuclear arms in Latin America and Africa. In the opinion of the Brazilian Delegation, the North American interest in the proposition is aimed at neutralizing the effect of the Soviet manifestation.

Suggestion for a decision to internationalize the Cuban crisis would permit Cuba and the Soviet Union to "save face", diminishing the dangerous possibility of direct confrontation.