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April 4, 1963

Research Memorandum RSB-47 from Thomas Hughes to the Secretary, 'Signs of Kremlin Decision to Improve Its Strategic Posture'

INR analysts pointed to events during mid-February 1963 which suggested that the Soviet leadership was taking steps to spend a greater share of the gross national product on military resources.

November 16, 1962

Excerpt from Protocol No. 66 of Session of CC CPSU Presidium, 'Instructions to Comrade A. I. Mikoyan'

Khrushchev explains his agreement with Kennedy to Ambassador Mikoyan, in which the Soviet Union promised to remove weapons from Cuba on the condition that the US will lift the quarantine and prevent further invasion or attacks on Cuba.

November 6, 1962

Ciphered Telegram from Anastas Mikoyan to CC CPSU

Mikoyan reports to the CC CPSU regarding his conversations with the Cuban leadership. Fide Castrol had concerns about the possible withdraw of all Soviet weapons and all military specialists from Cuba and the possibility of UN inspections on Cuban territory.

October 22, 1962

Telegram from TROSTNIK (Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky) to PAVLOV (General Isa Pliev)

Malinovsky warns Pliev of possible a American landing in Cuba and directs him to make preparations, a joint effort between Cuban and Soviet troops.

October 27, 1962

Cable, Ambassador Dobrynin to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Meeting with Robert Kennedy

January 24, 1963

Hungarian Embassy in Havana (Beck), Report on Soviet-Cuban Conflicts

Hungarian Ambassador to Cuba János Beck reports on post-Cuban-Missile-Crisis conflict between Cuba and the Soviet Union. Beck highlights Cuba’s tendency to act independent of socialist country opinion. He also mentions the negative influence of nationalism on the Cuban government, which has a direct influence on Soviet-Cuban relations. The Soviets believe Cubans do not understand that Soviet negotiations with the US secured Cuba from a future US invasion. The Cuban Missile Crisis also is evidence that neither the US or Soviet Union want to start a nuclear war.

December 5, 1962

Hungarian Legation in Washington (Radványi), Report on Mikoyan’s Visit to Washington

Hungarian Chargé d’Affaires János Radványi reports on Anastas Mikoyan’s visit to Washington, DC. After a brief description of Mikoyan’s Washington itinerary, the report is divided into three sections: Mikoyan’s impressions of his meetings with American officials, meetings in Cuba with Cuban officials, and meetings about different socialist countries (e.g. China, Hungary). Primary subjects discussed include the presence of missiles in Cuba, nuclear proliferation and Latin America as a nuclear free region, missile bases, and the Berlin issue.

November 30, 1962

Hungarian Embassy in Havana (Beck), Report on Cuban–Soviet Divergence

Hungarian Ambassador to Cuba János Beck reports on Cuban-Soviet divergence after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Cuba’s divergence includes other socialist countries, while preserving a special relationship with Czechoslovakia. Beck offers criticism of Cuba’s leadership, politics, and independent stance, but along with the Soviet Union reinforces that Cuba is true to the revolution.

November 29, 1962

Hungarian Embassy in Havana (Beck), Report on Soviet-Cuban Divergence

Hungarian Ambassador to Cuba János Beck reports on the Soviet-Cuban divergence after the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Provided with information by the Polish ambassador, Beck believes that the Cubans and Soviets had a strategic plan in placing missiles in Cuba, but the US reaction was more drastic than expected. Beck summarized facts about the crisis from 27-28 October and explains that the Cubans feel betrayed by the Soviet Union and their negotiations with the US.

November 12, 1962

Hungarian Socialist Workers Party First Secretary János Kádár’s Account of His Visit to Moscow to the HSWP Central Committee

János Kádár presents on his diplomatic trip to Moscow to the Hungarian Central Committee. Kádár first places the Cuban Missile Crisis in context. This includes describing the success of the Cuban revolution, US aggression towards Cuba, and the Cuban-Soviet military and defense agreement, which ultimately spawned the US’s unilateral military mobilization. Kádár then describes the Soviet Union’s strategy to achieve two goals: protect the Cuban revolution and preserve peace. He notes that Cuba and the Soviet Union disagree about how the crisis was resolved, but asks the congress of workers to show complete support of Soviet actions and successes.

Pagination