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Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

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Executive Committee of the National Security Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Cuban Missile Crisis

Cuba's National Capitol Building, January 2010.

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Nikita Khrushchev at the UNGA, 1962.

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich

1894- 1971

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Anastas Mikoyan in 1959

Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich

1895- 1978

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Fidel Castro, 1959.

Castro, Fidel

1926- 2016

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Kennedy, John F. (John Fitzgerald)

1917- 1963

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Malin, V. N.

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Drozniak, Edward

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President Ronald Reagan, Vice-President Bush, and oviet General Secretary Gorbachev

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Nikita Khrushchev Collection

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Sino-Soviet Split, 1960-1984

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October 1964	The Polyansky Report on Khrushchev’s Mistakes in Foreign Policy, October 1964 Excerpt from a report prepared by Politiburo member Dmitry Polyansky on Khrushchev's foreign policy mistakes, presented at 14 October 1964 CPSU Central Committee plenum. Polyansky included a scathing denunciation of Khrushchev’s “adventurism” in sending the missiles to Cuba, causing the “deepest of crises [that] brought the world to the brink of a nuclear war.” Ridiculing Khrushchev’s claims of having achieved a successful “penetration” of Latin America, Polyansky dismissed his contention that the crisis had in fact ended with a Soviet victory.
November 2, 1962	Chinese Embassy to the Soviet Union, Information on the report delivered by Maj. Boris Gelibusiji from the defense department of the Soviet Union in the Moscow Engineering and Physics College Further information from the Chinese Embassy to the Soviet Union on the report delivered by Maj. Boris Gelibusiji from the Defense Department of the Soviet Union in the Moscow Engineering and Physics College, describing comments he made on the Sino-Indian border conflict and the Cuban Missile Crisis.
November 6, 1962	Cable from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 'Instruction on How to Express Positions Regarding the Cuba-Soviet Relationship' Instructions from the Chinese Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Cuba instructing them to indicate their support for Fidel Castro's November 1st speech, but advising "with respect to the Cuban-Soviet relationship, [you] should not speak but listen [zhiting bushuo]."
November 16, 1962	Record of Conversation between Mikoyan and Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, Havana, 16 November 1962 The conversation takes place soon after the IL-28 crisis, which gives Mikoyan a chance to patch up the relationship with trade agreements and promises of future aid and industrial cooperation. Near the end of the conversation, Guevara and Mikoyan discuss the theory of revolutionary struggle. Guevara shares his vision that “further development of the revolutions in Latin America must follow the line of simultaneous explosions in all countries.” Mikoyan cautions him, pointing to the Soviet experience and using the metaphor of the rebellion on the battleship “Potemkin.” Hinting at further disagreement ahead, he gently registers his disagreement with the Cuban leader’s drive to ignite revolution in the hemisphere.
November 13, 1962	Record of Conversation between Mikoyan and Fidel Castro, Havana The conversation was recorded after the Cuban leader refused to see the Soviet envoy for three days in a reaction to the new demand. Castro starts by declaring his disagreement with the decision to remove the IL-28s but, assures Mikoyan that the revolutionary leadership discussed the issue and agreed to the removal. Mikoyan presents all his arguments to show that the withdrawal of the planes would end the crisis and make the US non-invasion pledge more credible. He acknowledges the “negative psychological effect” of the decision and reiterates that all the rest of the weapons would stay in Cuba so its security would be guaranteed without the obsolete planes. They also agree on the rules of verification of the withdrawal.
November 11, 1962	Telegram from Nikita Khrushchev to Anastas Mikoyan This telegram, written in Khrushchev's stream-of-consciousness style, outlines the rationale behind the decision to remove the missiles from Cuba that caused the crisis: It was much better to end the crisis by giving up planes that were already obsolete—to show that the Soviet Union and Cuba had fulfilled all the promises Khrushchev had given Kennedy—and consequently to expect, and demand, full compliance with the non-invasion pledge on the part of the United States, than to retain the planes and give the Americans a justification to violate their pledge. The telegram also spells out, in Khrushchev’s words, of the reasons why the weapons were deployed to Cuba in the first place.
December 3, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 71 Protocol 71 gives details to the immediate fallout of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Soviet perspective. Thanks to Castro’s so-called Armageddon letter and his five points, by December 1962 (date of this protocol), Khrushchev was calling the Cubans “unreliable allies.”
November 16, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 66 Protocol 66 is the first Malin note dated after the Cuban Missile Crisis, on 11 November. The tone of the protocol indicates that Castro is not pleased with Khrushchev's handling of the crisis, and there is a growing sense of distance between Cuba and the Soviet Union.
October 28, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 63 According to Protocol 63, Khrushchev probably assumed that Kennedy’s patience was at an end and the Cuban Missile Crisis might either be resolved or spin out of control, and the Kremlin again considered how it might respond to a US attack. If anyone suggested a preemptive strike, or even a retaliatory strike, against a target outside of the Caribbean, Malin did not note it for the official record.
November 10, 1962	Cable from the Chinese Embassy to the Soviet Union, 'A Report of the Speech Given By the Chief Editor of the Soviet Weekly Za Rubezhom' On the 31st of October, the chief editor of the Soviet weekly, Za Rubezhom delivered a report on current events in the Moscow Agriculture College. Regarding the Cuba problem and the Sino-Indian border problem.