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October 18, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 18 October 1962

Drozniak forwards a report from US Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs [Edwin M.] Martin. Martin says that the Americans are well-informed of the military situation in Cuba, that Cuba does not possess nuclear weapons (nor will they be likely to because the USSR did not give such weapons to China, so why would they give them to Cuba?), that the level of the Cuban economy is twenty-five percent lower than the period before Fidel Castro came to power and Cuba is much more economically dependent on the USSR, and finally that any military invasion or complete blockade of Cuba would be considered an act of war by the USSR.

October 18, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 18 October 1962

Drozniak discusses the possibility of US military action against Cuba, as well as Cuba's foreign relations with the USSR and the US.

March 19, 1963

Letter from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 19 March 1963

Boissevain writes of the continued presence of Russian military and economic advisors in Cuba, which are causes for concern. The ongoing question is for how long they will remain in Cuba and when do they leave. Boissevain says that last week approximately 1,000 advisors left the country, but with some note of resistance. However, the departure for them is a great relief for the average Cuban and Russian alike.

November 7, 1962

Cable from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 7 November 1962

The cable focuses on a report from the German embassy that in several places in Cuba, Soviet weapons are hidden under cement. There is still no progress on the dialogue between Fidel Castro and Anastas Mikoyan.

November 1, 1962

Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 1 November 1962

Dutch Ambassador to the United States J. Herman van Roijen sends a cable on a conversation he had with a member of the U.S. State Department. Firstly, the State Department was pleased to know Indonesian President Sukarno had not pledged support to Cuba during the crisis. Secondly, they hoped to make the point to Sukarno how alliance with the Soviets could not be relied upon, as the Cuban crisis and the Soviet abandonment of India have demonstrated. Thirdly, the Indonesian Ambassador Zain was going to pay six week visit to Jakarta, in an effort to promote U.S. economic support to Indonesia.

November 19, 1962

Memorandum of Conversation between Polish Leader Władysław Gomułka and British Journalist David Astor, 19 November 1962 (excerpt)

Polish leader Władysław Gomułka and British journalist David Astor discuss the stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union in the situation of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

October 30, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

Fidel Castro, after his first contacts with Brazilian President João Goulart’s special envoy Albino Silva, accepted well the Brazilian thesis which contains following: Denuclearization of the whole of Latin America and the embargo on atomic weapons delivery; Inspection by UN; Cuba would commit neither to export revolution nor to carry out any subversive activities; Cuba would be given guarantees for keeping its sovereignty and independence. The USA will accept the plan after negotiations. Russians “couldn’t think of anything better.”

November 8, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

Vidakovic has a conversation with Mikoyan on the USSR's guarantees to the independence of Cuba and the negotiations talks.

October 24, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

A telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry discussing the Cuban Missile Crisis and U.S.-USSR-Cuban relations. It says, the "American arguments in favor of the military blockade of Cuba are: firstly, they have solid proof that Cuba will get atomic weapons; secondly, Kennedy must take more severe measures because of the internal pressure, that’s why his option is blockade, although he is trying to transfer this issue to the UNO [United Nations Organization] in order to alleviate the pressure on himself; thirdly, transferring Cuba’s issue to the UNO he is creating a precedent against unilateral USSR actions in Berlin."

October 30, 1962

Cable from Swiss observer at the United Nations (Thalmann)

A telegram from the Swiss observer to the United Nations (Thalmann) about recent actions - the negotiation of ICRC participation in Cuba, the removal of the quarantine and the Soviet Union has declared that it would be willing to let representatives of the ICRC inspect its ships bound for Cuba.

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