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May 20, 1987	Letter, Fritz Streletz to Comrade Erich Honecker [about the Military Doctrine of the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty] The report examines the implications of the changes in the Warsaw Pact's new military doctrine adopted in May 1987 and its emphasis on the future defensive character of the alliance. The new doctrine stresses that the Warsaw Pact will never initiate military actions against another country unless it is attacked first, the Warsaw Pact will never employ nuclear weapons first, and the Warsaw Pact has no territorial claims against any other country in or outside of Europe.
November 10, 1966	Directive to the Soviet Representative at the United Nations The Soviet position was to not concur with the proposal to not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states without consideration of whether they had nuclear weapons (presumably belonging to a nuclear weapon state) on their territory.
April 26, 1966	Directive, CPSU CC Politburo to Cde. Roshchin, Soviet Representative in Geneva Soviets contact the ambassador in Geneva about possible discussions with the Swedes and the Polish about the "detection club".
April 26, 1966	Extract from Decisions of the Politburo of the CPSU CC of 23 April-4 May 1966, 'Point 21. On Steps in connection with the Proposal to Create a "Detection Club" with the Goals of Solving the Problem of Banning Underground Tests of Nuclear Weapons' USSR sending regards to the Polish ambassador about Poland joining the international "detection club" for underground nuclear tests.
December 14, 1978	Memorandum by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'The autumn sessions of NATO Ministers of Defense meetings (Eurogroup: 4th December; DPC 5th-6th December 1978)' The 1978 fall sessions of the Eurogroup and the Defense Planning Committee discussed the Alliance's reaction to new nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union and conventional build up of the Warsaw Pact. Even though the NATO states acknowledge that the Soviet Union will not be able to maintain its current efforts due to its economic problems, 1980s are seen as posing risks to the current peace.
August 14, 1967	Intelligence Note 669 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Tests of Soviet Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS)' Soviet tests of a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) attracted the interest of the US intelligence community because of the unique challenges it posed to defenses. At that point, August 1967, the US had no means to detect a FOBs attack but INR noted that a satellite detection system would be operational during 1970. This was a reference to the secret Defense Support Program (DSP), which would use infrared technology to detect missile launches and reduce any surprise advantage from the FOBs. The Soviets recognized this and later retired their twenty or so ICBMs with FOBs capabilities in 1983.
April 21, 1967	Research Memorandum RSB-46 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Soviet Policy on Nonproliferation Moves in Two Directions' Not altogether sure whether the Soviets were really committed to the NPT, the fact that the Soviets had been discussing security assurances with the Indians was seen as evidence that Moscow was interested in having a treaty. India was one of the countries that was especially resistant to the NPT and the Soviets were only one of a number of governments, e.g. Canada, which vainly tried to persuade Indira Gandhi to sign on.
April 12, 1967	Intelligence Note from Thomas L. Hughes to the Acting Secretary, 'Soviets Continue to Denounce American Interpretation of Nonproliferation Treaty' The Soviets were insisting that article III on safeguards mention only the IAEA but not the European Atomic Energy Community [EURATOM], even though West Germany and other EURATOM members resisted the idea of IAEA inspections in Western Europe. It would take quite a few months before the Article III wording was to everyone’s satisfaction, but the Soviets also objected to US interpretations of the proposed Article II which would permit a nuclear-armed, united Western Europe.
October 13, 1965	Research Memorandum RSB-115 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Soviet Views of Nuclear Sharing and Nonproliferation' INR looked closely at Soviet positions on an NPT arguing that the Soviets appeared to “attach a higher priority in using the nondissemination issue as a means of attacking possible NATO nuclear arrangements than in concluding an agreement.”
September 29, 1965	Research Memorandum RSB-106 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Soviet Conditions about Western Nuclear Arrangements for a Nondissemination Treaty' INR looked closely at Soviet positions on an NPT arguing that the Soviets appeared to “attach a higher priority in using the nondissemination issue as a means of attacking possible NATO nuclear arrangements than in concluding an agreement.”