Mazowiecki and CIA Director W. Webster discussed relaxing COCOM restrictions and Gorbachev’s response to both Lithuanian independence and German reunification.

Over two days of meetings, Bush and Mazowiecki discuss German reunification, the future of relations with the Soviet Union/Russia, and NATO.

The document discusses the Soviet position on German unification in six separate parts. The first deals with confusion over Gorbachev's better than expected consent to unification. Second are the potential domestic and foreign policy reasons the USSR consented so readily to unification, followed by the third part which outlines potential Soviet benefits from the process. The fourth section discusses the autonomy of the new German government, which is backed up with the fifth section discussing public sentiment. The final portion discusses the fine line for both the Soviet Union and the West between being overbearing on Germany's new independence and not helping enough.

The assessment by the Austrian Foreign Ministry of German Unity is broken into five subject areas. The first part concerns the responsibility of the Four Powers to a new unified Germany. Next, West Germany's commitment to German unity dating as far back as 1970. The third portion outlines the border and security concerns of East and West Germany, as well as the Soviet Union, United States, Great Britain, and France. The next part is focused on economic recovery, specifically the lack of certain goods in East Germany (ie cars and houses). Finally, the report addresses the future developments of a unified Germany with an emphasis on the security of nearby states.

The report discusses the conflicting views from countries such as the US and USSR surrounding German Reunification. It later explains predicted demographics, economics, and military prowess of a unified Germany.

An official report by Nyers about the Malta Summit prepared for Prime Minister Miklós Németh.

Record of a conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and H.D. Genscher discussing Helmut Kohl's Ten Points. Genscher expresses interest in negotiating with FRG and passing reforms in the GDR.

Gorbachev and Mulroney discuss US interference in Eastern Europe and increasing cooperation with Western Europe. They also briefly discuss George Bush's leadership.

After A.I Mikoyan's trip to the United States and his conversations with senior US government leaders, the USSR MFA submitted a draft of confidential information to be sent to the heads of government of several states. The content of the instructions to be told to the foreign leaders includes discussion of the German problem and Berlin, the problem of disarmament and a halt to nuclear testing, the Near and Middle East, the Far East, and other issues.

In this extraordinary conversation, Solidarity’s leader fears the collapse of the Wall would distract West Germany’s attention - and money - to the GDR, at the time when Poland, the trail-blazer to the post-communist era in Eastern Europe, desperately needed both. "Events are moving too fast," Walesa said, and only hours later, the Wall fell, and Kohl had to cut his Poland visit short to scramble back to Berlin, thus proving Walesa’s fear correct.