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Documents

February 1985

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'The Libyan Nuclear Program: A Technical Perspective'

For years, U.S. intelligence agencies did not take seriously Muammar Gaddafi’s efforts to develop a Libyan nuclear capability and this report provides early evidence of the perspective that the Libyan program “did not know what it was doing.” According to the CIA, the program’s “serious deficiencies,” including “poor leadership” and lack of both “coherent planning” and trained personnel made it “highly unlikely the Libyans will achieve a nuclear weapons capability within the next 10 years.” The Libyan effort was in such a “rudimentary stage” that they were trying to acquire any technology that would be relevant to producing plutonium or enriched uranium.

October 1977

Letter from South African Prime Minister Vorster to US President Carter on US-South Africa Relations

South African Prime Minister Vorster denies the existence of a South African nuclear program and lists hostile steps taken by the United States to exclude South Africa from international nuclear and atomic energy groups. He concludes that "it would seem... the United States officially holds the view that stability in Southern Africa and the future of our country is to be sacrificed in the hope of stopping Soviet expansionism."

April 23, 1956

Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Circular concerning the Transfer of Cadres and Workers to Participate in Atomic Energy Development Work (Excerpt)

A Chinese Central Committee circular stresses the need for China to develop a healthy uranium prospecting and mining industry, and to transfer technical and administrative cadres to work with Soviet experts.

April 12, 1948

Protocol No. 61 of a Meeting of the Special Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR (Excerpt)

Memorandum of the Special Committee of the CC CPSU postponing the geological prospecting for uranium in North Korea.

September 27, 1963

Conversation between Soviet Ambassador in North Korea Vasily Moskovsky and Soviet Specialists in North Korea

Soviet specialists in North Korea inform the Ambassador that the Koreans are attempting to acquire large amounts of uranium ore.

October 2, 1944

Letter from Boris Merkulov (USSR People’s Commissar for State Security) to Lavrenty Beria (USSR People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs)

Letter from Merkulov to Beria regarding the KGB’s efforts to obtain information about the creation of the atomic bomb and specifically about the related problems with uranium

September 29, 1946

Letter from Igor V. Kurchatov to Lavrenti Beria requesting additional support for the project on buiding an atomic bomb.

Igor Kurchatov, the scientific director of the Soviet nuclear project writes secret police chief Lavrenti Beria, whom Stalin had given principal responsibility for the atomic effort, asking for additional resources to solve uranium shortages faced by the project. (excerpts)

December 11, 1953

National Security Council, NSC 174, Draft 'United States Policy Toward The Soviet Satellites In Eastern Europe'

This report by the National Security Council discusses Soviet control over Eastern Europe, barriers to Soviet control of the satellites, and the power threat that consolidation poses to the United States. As a result, the NSC recommends that United States pursue a policy of resistance towards Soviet domination of its Eastern European satellites, and should impose pressure and propaganda to weaken Soviet influence.

Pagination