Directives for topics sent to the Soviet Delegation at the XII session of the IAEA General Conference. Points made include the Soviet Union's readiness to enrich Uranium.

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 29 June 1991 describes the latest developments in Yugoslavia, Iraq, Kuwait, the Soviet Union, PLO, Jordan, Ethiopia, Germany, Poland, Netherlands, Togo, Czechoslovakia, and Lebanon.

In a meeting with Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs V. M. Molotov, Czechoslovak Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jiri Horak requests that Stalin send greetings to the International Congress of Students to be held in Prague, expresses concerns about the implications of a joint Soviet-Czechoslovak company for developing uranium, and voices his hope that the Volhynia Czechs will be permitted to resettle in Czechoslovakia.

An excerpt of a document recovered from the Air India 101 crash assessing China's military capabilities.

This is a document containing talking points for Secretary of State Alexander Haig's meeting with Deng Xiaoping. Topics addressed in the document include: Chinese exportation of uranium and heavy water to South Africa and Argentina; the intention to suspend the prohibition of arm sales to China; greater nuclear and security cooperation; the increase in Chinese arm sales to countries dependent on the Soviet Union; and the desire to open a new consulate in Shenyang.

This report, sent from the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR to V.M. Molotov, informs Molotov that the project for Uranium enrichment was prepared by F. Lange and his colleagues by December, 1942. The installation of this project was planned to be produced outside of Ukraine, in a facility in Kasan.

This famous, de-classified document officially started the Soviet atomic project aimed at producing the nuclear bomb. The second point of this document orders the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences to establish a plan for the project of Uranium enrichment. F. Lange, a scientist from the Ukraine Institute of Physics and Technology, was appointed as head of this project because he worked previously on theoretical aspects of Uranium enrichment.

In this document, leading Soviet scientists criticize the idea of Kharkov physicists to use Uranium in military goals, because they do not believe it is possible to realize nuclear fission in the current practical conditions faced. The Soviet National Committee of Defence received these skeptical assessments in 1941 and decided not to develop the military nuclear program.

A report on the material requirements and design specifications of nuclear devices with yields of 150MT and one milliard tons TNT between Soviet officials. Specifically, the use of lithium-6 deuteride and natural uranium in varying degrees is discussed.

Resolution outlining the work of the newly established Design Bureau No.11 (KB-11). Atomic bombs are referred to in the resolution as “jet engines S,” in two versions, S-1 and S-2 (abbreviated as RDS-1 and RDS-2). RDS-1 meant the analog of the first U.S. plutonium-239 implosion type atomic bomb tested on 16 July 1945 in New Mexico RDS-2 signified the analog of the uranium-235 gun type bomb exploded over Hiroshima on 6 August 1945.