Andrei Gromyko describes the diplomatic measures he deems necessary to ensure the adherence of influential nations and countries in the Socialist sphere to the NPT. Valuing negotiation and diplomatic conversations between representatives, Gromyko especially seeks to obtain the support of countries who have previously expressed reservations about the treaty.

The ambassador in Sweden recounts his conversation with Astrom, director of the political department of the Swedish MoFA. Astrom mentions his desire to prevent the Plan from becoming overwhelmed amidst the Germany debate, along with his desire that negotiations do not take place with the Soviets.

The ambassador in Sweden reports on a conversation with Unden, the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sweden has some interest in the Plan in its new form, but not directly. Unden is worried about the FRG posing as an obstacle to the Plan.

Ambassador Pietkiewicz writes to Ogrodziński and Birecki to inform them about the stance of Scandinavian countries towards the Rapacki Plan. Representatives from Sweden, Norway, and Finland expressed support and were interested in more information or further discussion on the matter.

Deputy Minister Marian Naszkowski offers guidance for swaying public opinion in Sweden in favor of the Rapacki plan.

Reports from Washington, Ottawa, Cairo, Berlin, Brussells, Rome, Stockholm, and Helsinki discussing events that occurred from January-May 1957. Most of the contents revolved around meetings with other foreign officials and actions of embassy's host country.

Information on KGB counter-intelligence surveillance of Soviet tourists vacationing in other socialist countries who had contact with foreigners. The document states that Western intelligence services organized “friendship meetings” through tourist firms to meet Soviet citizens, gauge their loyalty to the USSR, and obtain political, economic, and military intelligence. KGB counter-intelligence paid particular attention to Soviet citizens who were absent from their groups, took side trips to different cities or regions, made telephone calls to foreigners, or engaged in “ideologically harmful” conversations in the presence of foreigners. Mirokhin regrets that the KGB underestimated the strengths and methodology of Western intelligence services. He concludes that the KGB should have adopted some of the same methods, and targeted Western tourists visiting socialist countries.