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October 29, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Moscow (Jaszczuk), 29 October 1962

Jaszczuk discusses the Cuban Missile Crisis with Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Firyubin.

October 28, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 28 October 1962

Jelen discusses the various diplomatic communication channels that are taking place during the Cuban Missile Crisis through speeches, letters, phone conversations, etc., mostly between the leaders of the US, the USSR and Cuba.

October 27, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 27 October 1962

Drozniak reports on his conversation with American journalist and syndicated columnist Joseph Alsop about the Cuban Missile Crisis.

October 27, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 27 October 1962

Jelen discusses the Cuban Missile Crisis: military and missile bases in Cuba and Turkey, UN inspections of Cuba and U-2 planes.

October 27, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Moscow (Paszkowski), 27 October 1962

[First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vasili Vasilyevich] Kuznetsov assessed the [UN] resolution of Ghana and the United Arab Republic [Egypt] as kind of a band-aid, but a one that nevertheless is significant. On the other hand, he considers the statement of the Afro-Asian nations as both good and strong.

October 26, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 26 October 1962

According to Drozniak, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk has allegedly reported that the latest statements of journalists claiming the relaxation of tensions in the Cuban Missile Crisis do not correspond to the reality of serious tensions between the US and USSR.

October 26, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 26 October 1962

Drozniak makes an assessment of the Cuban Missile Crisis situation, based on his conversations with foreign diplomats and respected journalists. Among other topics, he includes his opinion that "The operation of installing the [Soviet] missiles in Cuba was carried out in great hurry, without special adherence to secrecy, and perhaps even with the awareness that the missiles would be discovered relatively quickly. This [fact] has been interpreted [by the Americans] as [a possible] attempt by the USSR to test Kennedy’s “the will and readiness to fight.” [Soviet leader Nikita S.] Khrushchev chose Cuba, because he considered Berlin to be too dangerous."

October 25, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 25 October 1962

Drozniak discusses the ongoing Cuban Missile Crisis situation, including the rumors of a possible US military invasion of Cuba.

October 24, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Moscow (Paszkowski), 24 October 1962

Paszkowski discusses changes in the tensions of the Cuban Missile Crisis situation, including his opinion that the US's recent actions and rhetoric were a pre-election bluff.

October 24, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 24 October 1962

On the Cuban Crisis situation, Jelen says that Soviet Ambassador Aleksandr Alekseyev is optimistic but Brazilian Ambassador Luis Bastian Pinto is concerned. Jelen also gives his own impressions of the crisis, saying that "There’s a relative run on the stores, but without any signs of panic and fears of the threat of military operations."

Pagination