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September 19, 1962

Ministry of Defence, 'Notes on Talks During the Minister of Defence’s Visit to the United States, September 1962, Nuclear Problems in Europe'

In September 1962, British Defence Minister Peter Thorneycroft traveled to Washington for discussion on defense cooperation. During a flight with President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara, they discussed the French nuclear program and the possibility of French-German nuclear cooperation.

November 21, 1961

Memorandum of Conversation, Private Conversations Between the President and Chancellor Adenauer, 'Germany'

The ongoing crisis over West Berlin brought Adenauer to Washington for talks on strategy, diplomacy, and contingency planning. During this discussion, Kennedy wanted to determine where the Chancellor stood on the nuclear questions, specifically whether his government would continue to observe the 1954 declaration renouncing the production of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

February 18, 1960

Hugh S. Cuming, Director, Office of Intelligence and Research, to Secretary of State, 'Growing Revelation of West German Interest in Nuclear Striking Force in Europe'

This State Department intelligence report touched upon a key issue for West German policy: a desire to upgrade West Germany’s nuclear role without putting it in control of nuclear weapons. According to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), the West Germans faced a “dilemma” because of the development of Soviet strategic missile capabilities.

December 14, 1957

John Foster Dulles, Memorandum of Conversation with Chancellor Adenauer

Conversation between John Foster Dulles and Chancellor Adenauer at a NATO meeting. Dulles learned from Adenauer that the French-West German project on nuclear weapons research would soon come to include Italy, to which Dulles expressed reservations and suggested a broader arrangement including the U.S. and the U.K.

August 12, 1957

Letter from Max Isenbergh, Special Assistant for Atomic Energy, to Robert Schaetzel, Office of Special Assistant to Secretary of State for Atomic Energy, enclosing 'Franco-German Coordination of Advanced Weapons Research, Development, and Production'

During the summer of 1957, diplomats in London and Washington were becoming uneasy as they learned that France and West Germany were setting up formal arrangements to cooperate in the development of advanced weapons systems.

October 27, 1954

Memorandum of Conversation with British, French, and German Embassy Officials, 'German Atomic Energy Program'

In this meeting, Werner Heisenberg, a key figure in Nazi Germany’s atomic bomb project, reaffirmed the West German commitment not to manufacture atomic weapons to a group of U.S., British, and French officials in Washington.

October 22, 1976

Cable No. 17944, US Embassy Bonn to the Secretary of State, 'Expulsions of North Korean Diplomats from Scandinavian Countries'

An official at the American Embassy in Bonn discusses the North Korean smuggling scandals in Scandinavia, suggests possible connections between the scandals and North Korean Embassies elsewhere in Europe, and confirms the absence of North Korean smuggling in the Federal Republic of Germany.

March 1, 1967

Research Memorandum REU-13 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Reasons for West German Opposition to the Non-Proliferation Treaty'

By the late winter/early spring of 1967, controversy over the NPT was hurting US-West German relations, placing them at perhaps their lowest point during the Cold War. While this report suggested that West Germany would ultimately sign the Treaty, despite objections, only weeks later the INR issued another report wondering whether Bonn was trying to wreck the NPT.

March 3, 1967

Research Memorandum REU-14 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'How Major NATO Countries View the Prospect of an ABM Deployment'

Despite new information that the Soviet Union was deploying anti-ballistic missile defenses around Moscow, the United States had not yet decided to deploy its own ABM defenses (although a decision would be made later in the year) and there was some hope that U.S.-Soviet talks would prevent an ABM race. If, however, talks failed, some NATO allies worried about the “adverse consequences” of an ABM race, especially whether having an ABM system might incline Washington toward risk taking.

October 13, 1965

Research Memorandum RSB-115 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Soviet Views of Nuclear Sharing and Nonproliferation'

INR looked closely at Soviet positions on an NPT arguing that the Soviets appeared to “attach a higher priority in using the nondissemination issue as a means of attacking possible NATO nuclear arrangements than in concluding an agreement.”

Pagination