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"The Bundeshaus (Federal Building) in Bonn, West Germany, May 1961. "

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July 1, 1966	Memorandum of Conversation between William C. Foster, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Karl Carstens, State Secretary at the West German Foreign Office, 'Disarmament and Related Problems' In this conversation, West German State Secretary Karl Carstens told ACDA director William C. Foster that Bonn was still committed to a “hardware” solution, “if not in the form of an MLF than in some form.” Refraining from making any commitment, Foster wanted to leave the question “open.”
November 1, 1965	Thomas L. Hughes, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to the Secretary, 'Dobrynin’s October 29 Oral Statement on Nonproliferation' In this report, the INR commented on Soviet policy language regarding nuclear proliferation. They called Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin's criticism of MLF proposals "absurd," telling Secretary Rusk that “in no way can we be blamed for taking steps which even with a most fault-finding approach would look like disseminating nuclear weapons."
October 27, 1965	'The Danger from a Psychotic Germany,' Appendix to 'The Case for a Strong American Lead to Establish a Collective Nuclear System That Would Help the Western World from Repeating an Old Mistake,' attached to George W. Ball to Secretary Rusk, et al. Under Secretary George W. Ball signed off on a fervent expression of his apprehensions about the direction of West German policy should the West fail to establish an MLF leading Bonn to feel “rejection and discrimination.” Ball saw three bad possibilities: a national nuclear program, a French-German nuclear deal, or “the real danger, a German political adventure.”
October 23, 1965	Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State Rusk and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Jozef Winiewicz, 'Security, Non-Proliferation and the German Problem' This wide-ranging discussion between Rusk and Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Jozef Winiewicz on European security, nuclear weapons, and the problem of German reunification illuminated U.S. and Polish concerns about the future of Germany.
June 4, 1965	Memorandum of Conversation with West German chancellor Ludwig Erhard, 'Nuclear Matters' In this conversation, Erhard mentioned a briefing by McNamara that detailed U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in the Federal Republic. After Erhard wished that the numbers could be publicly disclosed, Ambassador George McGhee observed that it was “often overlooked that Germany was actually the third largest nuclear country in the world.”
December 7, 1964	Memorandum of Conversation between President Johnson and Prime Minister Harold Wilson In this conversation, President Johnson and Prime Minister Wilson discuss the MLF and the proposed ANF--the "Atlantic Nuclear Force," a British proposal as an alternative to the MLF. The two leaders weighed the pros and cons of both proposals, with President Johnson ultimately deciding to give a positive response to the ANF, leaving it up to the British to see if Bonn could be enlisted.
August 2, 1963	US Embassy Bonn Airgram A-250 to State Department, 'Secretary McNamara’s Conversation with Chancellor Adenauer' In this conversation, Chancellor Adenauer and Secretary McNamara discussed the West Germans signing the U.S. proposed Limited Test Ban Treaty, which Adenauer felt would be a "success" for the Soviets. Adenauer worried that signing the same documents as the Soviets would recognize the Soviet Occupied Zone.
May 22, 1964	State Department Executive Secretary Benjamin H. Read to National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, 'NSAM 241 on Report on French Gaseous Diffusion Plant' Noting that the situation that gave rise to NSAM 41 had improved, Read informed Bundy that intelligence reporting would continue but he wanted permission to stop work responsive to the NSAM. There had been “no indication of any attempts by the French to enlist German or Italian cooperation in the Pierrrelatte project.”
October 10, 1963	Memorandum of Conversation between President Kennedy and Foreign Minister Gromyko, 'Non-Dissemination and the MLF' In this conversation, President Kennedy and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko discussed the Soviet attitude toward the MLF. Gromyko argued that it would be a barrier to a nonproliferation agreement. Kennedy made the standard argument that “one of the reasons for an MLF was to make it less possible for the Germans to press for nuclear weapons of their own.”
June 11, 1963	A.A. Wells, Director of Office of International Affairs, AEC, to Dr. Ragnar Rollefson, Director, Office of International Scientific Affairs, 'Reported Franco-German Cooperation in Development of the French Gaseous Diffusion Efforts' In this memorandum, Wells reported on comments that West German Minister for Scientific Research Hans Lenz made during a meeting at the Atomic Energy Convention. Noting that West Germany had been holding talks with the French and EURATOM about building a reprocessing plant at Karlsruhe, Lenz “implied that this proposal quite likely had resulted in reports that Germany might be undertaking a cooperative program with France in the development of their gaseous diffusion plant at Pierrelatte.” Lenz then reaffirmed West Germany's commitment to the 1955 Brussels Treaty pledge, declaring that West Germany would not initiate action to develop military applications of atomic energy.