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December 13, 1988

Telegram by Ambassador Vanni D'Archirafi to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'NATO Ministerial meeting in the light of Gorbachev's announcement to the United Nations - West Germany's assessments'

The telegram decribes West Germany's reactions on Gorbachev's December 7, 1988 address at the UN where he announces drastic changes in Soviet foreign and security policy.

December 10, 1957

Letter, Nikolai Bulganin to Dwight D. Eisenhower

Bulganin proposes a halt on nuclear tests among the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom beginning on January 1, 1958.

October 22, 1976

Cable No. 17944, US Embassy Bonn to the Secretary of State, 'Expulsions of North Korean Diplomats from Scandinavian Countries'

An official at the American Embassy in Bonn discusses the North Korean smuggling scandals in Scandinavia, suggests possible connections between the scandals and North Korean Embassies elsewhere in Europe, and confirms the absence of North Korean smuggling in the Federal Republic of Germany.

July 15, 1969

German Nuclear Work

Correspondence regarding French diplomatic reporting that West Germany was developing nuclear weapons capability. H.T. Morgan concludes that the French claims are baseless and an example of "flesh creeping" activities to discourage the United Kingdom from nuclear collaboration with West Germany

May 9, 1950

Schuman Declaration at Salon de l'Horloge at the Quai d'Orsay in Paris

In this speech, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman reads a statement describing a shared organization that would manage French and German production of coal and steel. It served as a foundational moment for European integration and the future European Economic Community.

March 1, 1967

Research Memorandum REU-13 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Reasons for West German Opposition to the Non-Proliferation Treaty'

By the late winter/early spring of 1967, controversy over the NPT was hurting US-West German relations, placing them at perhaps their lowest point during the Cold War. While this report suggested that West Germany would ultimately sign the Treaty, despite objections, only weeks later the INR issued another report wondering whether Bonn was trying to wreck the NPT.

March 3, 1967

Research Memorandum REU-14 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'How Major NATO Countries View the Prospect of an ABM Deployment'

Despite new information that the Soviet Union was deploying anti-ballistic missile defenses around Moscow, the United States had not yet decided to deploy its own ABM defenses (although a decision would be made later in the year) and there was some hope that U.S.-Soviet talks would prevent an ABM race. If, however, talks failed, some NATO allies worried about the “adverse consequences” of an ABM race, especially whether having an ABM system might incline Washington toward risk taking.

October 13, 1965

Research Memorandum RSB-115 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Soviet Views of Nuclear Sharing and Nonproliferation'

INR looked closely at Soviet positions on an NPT arguing that the Soviets appeared to “attach a higher priority in using the nondissemination issue as a means of attacking possible NATO nuclear arrangements than in concluding an agreement.”

September 29, 1965

Research Memorandum RSB-106 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Soviet Conditions about Western Nuclear Arrangements for a Nondissemination Treaty'

INR looked closely at Soviet positions on an NPT arguing that the Soviets appeared to “attach a higher priority in using the nondissemination issue as a means of attacking possible NATO nuclear arrangements than in concluding an agreement.”

July 15, 1965

Research Memorandum REU-25 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Attitudes of Selected Countries on Accession to a Soviet Co-sponsored Draft Agreement on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'

With a nuclear nonproliferation treaty under consideration in Washington, INR considered which countries were likely to sign on and why or why not. INR analysts, mistakenly as it turned out, believed it unlikely that the Soviet Union would be a co-sponsor of a treaty in part because of the “international climate” and also because Moscow and Washington differed on whether a treaty would recognize a “group capability.”

Pagination