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"The Bundeshaus (Federal Building) in Bonn, West Germany, May 1961. "

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West Germany

The Palace of the Republic (Palast der Republik) in Berlin

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East Germany

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

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Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

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Nuclear Proliferation

Aerial photograph of CIA headquarters

United States. Central Intelligence Agency

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West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, 1971.

Brandt, Willy

1913- 1992

Mikhail Gorbachev, 1986

Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich

1931- 2022

Berlin Wall between Mitte and Kreuzberg

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George H.W. Bush and Lech Walesa

CIA Reports on the Collapse of Communism in Europe

Trade agreement between European Economic Community and China

China-Europe Relations

Photograph of Gorbachev-Bush summit at Malta, 1989

End of the Cold War

Photograph of Helmut Kohl, 1982.

Kohl, Helmut

1930- 2017

Nikita Khrushchev at the UNGA, 1962.

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich

1894- 1971

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United States. Department of State. Bureau of Intelligence and Research

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October 6, 1967	State Department Telegram 50379 to US Embassy Bonn, 'NPT' In this meeting with Deputy Under Secretary Eugene Rostow, West German Embassy official Georg Lilienfeld listed desiderata, including a limited y duration, assurances against Soviet blackmail, acceptable language for the safeguards article, “more balanced rights and obligations,” and non-recognition of the German Democratic Republic.
May 10, 1967	Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State Dean Rusk and State Secretary Baron Guttenberg, 'German Views on NPT and NATO' This conversation between Rusk and Baron Guttenberg, a top official on Kiesinger’s staff and the CDU foreign policy spokesperson, demonstrated that accepting Bonn’s suggestions for the NPT draft had not made it more acceptable to the West Germans. Guttenberg emphasized the importance of a limited duration clause and the need for the Soviet Union to make a “counter-concession” in exchange for a West German signature on an NPT.
April 26, 1967	Memorandum of Conversation between President Johnson and Chancellor Kiesinger In this conversation, Johnson and Kiesinger discussed the state of U.S.-German relations, Johnson’s irritation with German critical press coverage and public opinion, Kiesinger’s worries about the NPT and the withdrawal of U.S. forces, Johnson’s concern about the high costs of keeping troops in Western Europe, and U.S. interest in a “different relationship with the Soviet Union.”
April 26, 1967	Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Foreign Minister Willie Brandt, 'Non-Proliferation Treaty' During this meeting, Brandt and Rusk discussed the French attitude toward a West German signature on the NPT, thew problem of "duration", and suggestions for mitigating the West German concerns. Brandt said that De Gaulle “expected” Bonn to sign but if that de Gaulle was asked for advice, he would recommend that Germany not sign.
April 21, 1967	'The President’s Trip to Germany (Chancellor Adenauer's Funeral), April 1967, Background Paper, The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Germany' This document detailed West German suggestions which Washington incorporated into the NPT draft.The cover memorandum reviewed the sources of West German discontent with the NPT.
April 20, 1967	US Embassy Bonn Telegram 12582 to State Department, 'NPT—Duration,' partly garbled transmission A message from the Bonn embassy highlighted an issue that had been raised by West German diplomats and which Ambassador McGhee correctly believed represented thinking at the top: Chancellor Kiesinger’s objection to an NPT “of unlimited duration.”
April 6, 1967	US Embassy Bonn Telegram 11806 to State Department, 'Vice President’s Visit III: Non-Proliferation Treaty' During this discussion with Vice President Humphrey, Kiesinger declared that the NPT was a “serious problem,” but said that he disagreed with some West German conservatives that it was “was not politically acceptable.” For Kiesinger, the problem was the Soviet Union, “which for years, and without any reason had attacked, slandered and threatened” West Germany.
March 21, 1967	US Department of State Airgram CA-6579 to US Embassy Moscow, 'Kosygin's Remarks on Non-Proliferation in London' In this Airgram, the U.S. embassy in Bonn sent a translation of Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin's tough statement on the NPT at a press conference in London. Kosygin stated (of West Germany) "whether she wants this or not, such a document should be signed, because we will not allow the Federal Republic of Germany to possess nuclear weapons."
March 10, 1967	US Embassy Bonn Telegram 10500 to State Department, 'Ambassador Foster’s Meeting with Chancellor Kiesinger' To try to strengthen West German confidence, ACDA director William C. Foster met with Chancellor Kiesinger, who expressed concern about the danger of “erosion” and “uncertainty” in U.S.-West German relations and the need for more time for consultations. Kiesinger’s “own idea was that it would have been better …to have discussed all aspects of non-proliferation ‘behind locked doors’ before any intention of signing the treaty had become public.”
March 1, 1967	Gottfried William Moser, ACDA/Bureau of International Relations, 'Consultations with the FRG' In this report and after criticism over the NPT in West Germany, ACDA official G. William Moser looked into the chronology of U.S.-West German interactions. Noting that Washington had “stood foursquare with [the FRG] on the question of maintaining the MLF option under a non-proliferation treaty,” he highlighted a decision made by Rusk on 18 October 1966 to defer consultations with Bonn until he was sure that the Soviets were “serious” about the new Article I language. He concluded that Washington may need to explain Rusk's rationale.