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Documents

December 1985

Memorandum to Holders of Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 93-83, 'Brazil’s Changing Nuclear Goals: Motives and Constraints'

The SNIEs from 1983 and the 1985 update emphasize Brazil’s quest for technological-industrial autonomy which in nuclear terms meant developing an indigenous program to master the fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities. In seeking those objectives, Brazil did not want to face any constraints, and its leaders were unresponsive to US or other pressures for safeguards on nuclear facilities. According to the 1985 report the prominent role of the military in nuclear activities, “the direction of Brazil’s nuclear r&d,” and the CNEN president’s “reputation of favoring a nuclear option” posed a “danger to US interests in Brazil.”

October 21, 1983

Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 93-83, 'Brazil’s Changing Nuclear Goals: Motives and Constraints'

Brazilian nationalism has often posed a challenge to US official precepts on the way the world should work and these estimates convey the deep Brasilia-Washington gap over nuclear policy during the 1980s. The SNIEs from 1983 and the 1985 update emphasize Brazil’s quest for technological-industrial autonomy which in nuclear terms meant developing an indigenous program to master the fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities. In seeking those objectives, Brazil did not want to face any constraints, and its leaders were unresponsive to U.S. or other pressures for safeguards on nuclear facilities.

February 23, 1978

Memorandum, Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira, Information for the President of Brazil, 'Nuclear Issues. Meeting at 13/02/78. Alvorada Palace.'

Report of a meeting between President Geisel and his top nuclear advisors on the eve of President Carter’s visit to Brazil and Geisel’s trip to West Germany. Issues discussed include: the delay in the construction of the Angra I, II and III nuclear plants; the unreliability of the US and Urenco (mainly due to Dutch reticence) as suppliers of nuclear fuel; the rising costs of the German deal; and the dissatisfaction with the jet nozzle enrichment technology and the possibility of renegotiating with Germany for the purchase of ultracentrifugation technology. Both Foreign Minister Silveira and President Geisel admitted the possibility of acceding to the NPT if necessary to get the technology.

April 2, 1974

Memorandum, Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira, Information for the President of Brazil, 'Uranium Enrichment'

Confidential report identifying major trends regarding uranium supply. The document assesses US capacity to supply nuclear fuel after 1980, and describes European initiatives to manage the fuel cycle. The document underscores the convenience of defining guidelines, which “might ensure Brazilian leadership in Latin America” (p.105); then, it outlines the difficulties inherent to the establishment of a bilateral agreement with the US (taking into account the Brazilian position vis-à-vis the NPT), and suggests Europe (most notably West Germany) as a potential partner. The document recommends the establishment of a confidential working group formed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Mines and Energy in order to set up a strategy that would allow for the establishment of a nuclear cooperation agreement with the partner country, at the time still undefined.

October 3, 1990

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telephone Call to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany, October 3, 1990, 9:56-9:59 a.m.

Telephone conversation between President George H. W. Bush and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl on the situation in Germany.

February 13, 1990

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telephone Call from Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany, February 13, 1990, 1:49-2:00 p.m. EST

Telephone conversation between President George H. W. Bush and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl on the situation in Germany.

October 23, 1989

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telephone Call from Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany, October 23, 1989, 9:02-9:26 a.m. EDT

Telephone conversation between President George H. W. Bush and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl on the situation in Eastern Europe.

August 19, 1971

Cable from Ambassador Rush to Henry Kissinger Regarding the Four Powers Negotiations on Berlin

Rush updates National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger on the progress of the Four Powers Negotiations on Berlin, informing him that the "bureaucrats [in the State Department] have been foiled" and an agreement has been completed and "it contains virtually everything we hoped to get under our maximum demands."

August 15, 1971

Cable from Ambassador Rush to Kissinger Regarding Four Powers Negotiations on Berlin

US Ambassador Rush informs Kissinger on the progress of negotiations between the Soviet Union, France, Great Britain, and the United States on the status of Berlin.

August 13, 1971

Cable from Ambassador Rush to Kissinger Regarding Four Powers Negotiations on Berlin

US Ambassador Rush informs Kissinger on the progress of negotiations between the Soviet Union, France, Great Britain, and the United States on the status of Berlin. He reports that negotiations have gone well, aside from difficulties with the British and French ambassadors.

Pagination