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Documents

April 7, 1972

State Department cable 59655 to US Embassy United Kingdom, 'Indian Nuclear Intentions'

The British Government took the same view as the Canadians, seeing no evidence that the Indians had made a decision to do a nuclear test, although they had the “capability.”

April 2004

KGB Active Measures in Southwest Asia in 1980-82

Materials provided by former KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin to CWIHP, following the publication of the Working Paper No. 40, "The KGB in Afghanistan." As with all Mitrokhin’s notes, his compilation on Soviet “active measures” in South and Southwest Asia is based on other smuggled-out notes and was prepared especially for CWIHP. Please read the Notes on Sources for information on the nature and limitations of these documents.

January 1, 1950

Memorandum, Conversation of Mao and USSR Ambassador to China N.V. Roshchin on 1 January 1950

Mao Zedong informs Roshchin that India and Burma had expressed interest in establishing diplomatic relations with China, and that the UK may follow suit. The Chinese position, Mao said, is to agree to negotiations if these governments renounced their ties with the Guomindang. Mao and Roshchin also discussed the military situation and the question of Japanese POWs. Mao did not the POWs right away because the Chinese legal system was not developed enough. He also informed Roshchin of his intention to curtain stay in the USSR.

February 13, 1980

Ciphered Telegram No. 26, Embassy of Hungary in Pakistan to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

Short report on Indian diplomatic overtures to Pakistan in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

August 24, 1955

Cable from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 'Analysis of the Private Dinner and the 10th Meeting and Instructions for the 11th Meeting of the Sino-US Ambassadorial Talks'

The Foreign Ministry instructed Wang that China would not have a determined time to release all the American citizens, as the US requested. However, China could agree to deal with the issue “as soon as possible” in the amendment.

August 10, 1955

Cable from the Chinese Foreign Ministry to Wang Bingnan, 'Talking Points for the Fifth Meeting'

The Chinese Foreign Ministry instructed Chinese Representative Wang Bingnan to have the following major agreements in writing on the fifth meeting:
(1) Any nationals who were willing to return to their countries should be granted permission;
(2) China designated India and the US designated the UK to facilitate the repatriation of each other’s nationals.

December 28, 1956

Third World Reaction to Hungary and Suez, 1956: A Soviet Foreign Ministry Analysis

Tugarinov wrote this overview of reactions to the events in Hungary and Suez by third world nations. Tugarinov reports that the events in Hungary and the Near East increased the prestige of the United States.

July 17, 1954

From the Journal of Molotov: Top Secret Memorandum of Conversation with Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong

Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, and Vietnamese Vice-Premier Pham Van Dong discuss various topics relevant to the Geneva Convention, including the construction of foreign military bases in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, the line of demarcation between North and South Vietnam, the establishment of regrouping zones in northeast Laos, the withdrawal of foreign troops from Indochina, and the possible formation of an international supervisory commission.

July 13, 1950

Ciphered telegram, Filippov [Stalin] to Zhou Enlai or Mao Zedong (via Roshchin)

Telegram from Stalin to Mao and Zhou Enlai detailing his response to the English protest concerning "the Korean question." Also, a request for confirmation of Chinese troop movements to the Sino-Korea border, in case of a repulse of North Korean forces. Finally, a confirmation of the plans to train Chinese pilots on Soviet jets, to be followed by the transfer of the jets to Chinese possession.

June 28, 1954

Record of the First Meeting between Premier Zhou and Prime Minister U Nu

Zhou Enlai and U Nu first talked about the decision made on the Geneva Conference regarding the armistice in the Korean Peninsula and the role of the US in it. Then they talked about the elements that complicated the Sino-Burmese relations and the need for building mutual trust and signing a non-political agreement. They also discussed the principles they would have in a joint statement before the signing of this potential agreement.

Pagination