Mao Zedong and Nehru discuss Sino-Indian relations, the political situation in Asia, and the role of the United States in world politics.

F.C. How of the Ministry of Supply replies to Roger Makins of the Foreign Office regarding negotiations for British nuclear cooperation with India.

John D. Cockcroft, head of the British Atomic Energy Research Establishment, writes to Homi J. Bhabha, Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, informing him that the British will not be assisting India with its beryllium experiements since India has already made agreements with the French Atomic Energy project.

John D. Cockcroft of the UK Atomic Energy Authority answers questions from Homi Bhabha regarding nuclear research and includes the text of a lecture he gave regarding the development of nuclear power in the UK.

Responding to concerns about Great Britain expressed earlier by Premier Zhou in an earlier conversation, Ambassador Nehru reports that UK Prime Minister Macmillan believes that any major powers conference on disarmament should be organized by the US and USSR. Ambassador Nehru emphasized the necessity of Chinese involvement to PM Macmillan.

UN Representative Milko Tarabanov reported to the Bulgarian Communist Party Politburo recent developments of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The report summarizes the conference's work from November 1962-December 1962, the period following the Cuban Missile Crisis. Tarabanov reports that Western powers put forward two draft agreements calling for the cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, and underground--the proposals were debated during the 17th United Nations session.

The Cubam Missile Crisis occurred during the conference's session. Main issues discussed after Cuban Missile Crisis included: suspension of nuclear tests, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's proposal at the 17th session of the UN, ways to measure nuclear weapons testing, and military alliances (NATO).

Tarabanov also addresses the inter workings of conference members--Western, socialist, and neutral--including disagreements among Western powers. In summary Tarabanov adds that the prospect for cessation of nuclear tests is poor, but notes that the US may consider closing military bases, though not under pressure of the Soviet Union or neutral countries.

Description of the reaction to the Asian-African Conference in both participating countries and capitalist ruled countries.

A letter from S.S. Bhatnagar to Dr. Bhabha via the Indian Embassy in Washington D.C. apprising him of a visit with to the Atomic Energy Commission as well as providing an update on the acquisition of needed minerals.

A meeting between British Foreign Office and State Department officials on the Indian nuclear problem occurred the same month that Indian Prime Minister Gandhi approved the “final preparations for a PNE.” Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Christopher T. Van Hollen (the father of the future Maryland Congressman) and his colleagues followed the approach taken by the Special National Intelligence Estimate, which was close to that taken by the British Joint Intelligence Committee. According to country director David Schneider, the “odds were about even” that India would make a decision, but once it was made, India could test very quickly. There was “no firm intelligence” that a “go-ahead signal” to prepare for a test had been made. Schneider reviewed bilateral and multilateral steps, proposed in the NSSM 156 study, that the U.S. and others could take to try to discourage an Indian test and the range of reactions that would be available if India went ahead. A “weak” U.S. reaction, Schneider observed, would suggest that Washington would “acquiesce” if other countries followed India’s example.

The Canadian embassy had asked the State Department for information on the intelligence reports from earlier in the year that an Indian nuclear test was “imminent.” The State Department denied the request, but informed the Canadians that the reports were so numerous and their “congruity, apparent reliability, and seeming credibility” so striking that it had become necessary to update official thinking about Indian intentions.