Andrei Gromyko updates the CPSU CC on the proceedings of the 22nd Session of the General Assembly, as it pertains to the NPT. In this note, he states that the Soviet delegation has arranged for the NPT to open for signatures immediately after the conclusion of all deliberation on the non-proliferation issue. Gromyko also points out that the US has agreed to open the treaty to signatures on July 1, 1968.

The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs announces its decision to open the NPT for signing in Moscow, Washington, and London beginning on July 1, 1968.

This press release acts as an example for journalists to follow when covering the proceedings of the NPT's signing. Along with basic information about the nations involved in the signing of the NPT, the document lists the names of every notable Soviet official who will be present at the event.

The CPSU CC outlines the details and logistics of the NPT's signing in Moscow. Along with nominating a reception hall and authorizing Gromyko to sign the treaty, this decree focuses on the publication of an official memorandum suggesting urgent measures to end the arms race.

This document is a communication to the Soviet UN delegation in New York, written by Vasily Vasilievich Kuznetsov, the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

This document is a communication to the Soviet UN delegation in New York, written by Vasily Vasilievich Kuznetsov, the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs describes its contingency plan in case the US and UK refuse to sign the NPT in Geneva. This plan entails opening the treaty for signatures at the same time in Moscow, Washington, and London, using (presumably) the 1966 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies as a precedent for signing an agreement in three places at once.

The memorandum describes a difference between President Carter and the West Europeans over their commitment to limiting reprocessing and plutonium supplies for R&D work on breeder reactors.

This document describes the meeting of 15 nuclear supplier states in London where issues were discussed such as full-scope safeguards, including sanctions in the guidelines, purpose of supplier consent, moratoriums, enlargement of membership, and various countries' individual concerns were voiced and addressed.

This document provides an overview of the London Nuclear Suppliers' Meeting which included the addition of the five newest countries to the original seven. Most old and new members were receptive when Washington lobbied them to support a “long term and stable regime of restraint” on the export of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology. While the French were supportive of the moratorium proposal, the Germans were uncomfortable with it, not least because of the implications for their deal with Brazil.

In this document regarding the final agreement, George Vest wrote Kissinger that it “served to close many of the loopholes and inadequacies of previous nuclear cooperation agreements between suppliers and recipients.” It also put the French and West Germans on record to restrict access to sensitive nuclear technologies. Nevertheless, as Vest noted, the guidelines would not prevent “indigenous” development of nuclear capabilities and “unsafeguarded developments” or the acquisition of sensitive technology.