Comments by Robert Alston of the British Foreign Office on the State Department's "non-paper" on Pakistan. He questions the list of countries and expresses concern about the response of states with their own covert nuclear programs, like South Korea and Taiwan.

U.S. demarche and "non-paper" on Pakistan's attempts to complete the plutonium reprocessing plant and develop nuclear weapons. Sent to 12 countries to ensure that they "exercise vigilance and appropriate control to deter Pakistan from acquiring sensitive facilities."

United Kingdom response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development. U.K. and U.S. Embassies will be cooperating in delivering information to Spain and Belgium.

Summary of a British report on problems with the export "trigger list" of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The list did not include gray area items that could be used in building nuclear facilities. To begin correcting the problem, the British announced a ban of inverter exports and asked other governments to take parallel steps. Also includes a summary of a secret British paper on Pakistan nuclear intentions. The British believed that the “piecemeal” Pakistani purchasing efforts to acquire inverters were directly related to the building of a gas centrifuge unit for producing weapons-grade uranium. Attached to the cable is a 7 November "Memorandum for the Record" discussing sharing this information with the Department of Energy.

British ambassador's meeting with Spanish Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs to discuss the UK demarche on inverter exports. Under Secretary agrees to cooperate and block all loopholes.

Cable from U.S. Embassy in Stockholm debating Swedish responsiveness to U.S. and British demarches on inverters and reprocessing technology. It was an open question whether the Swedes were putting inverters on their trigger list and the U.S. would stay in touch with their British colleagues.

Discussion of a British list of countries that were actual or potential manufacturers of inverters. The U.S. does not want to approach any "nuclear threshold states" yet because some might not cooperate or might inform Pakistan. Also discusses strategies for approaching the Soviet Union and China in the future.

Britain agrees with U.S. thinking on the matter of State Department cable 292469, except on its approach to the Soviet Union. Britain decided not to approach the Soviets because they were unsure whether Moscow’s “commitment to nonproliferation outweighs their special political interests vis-à-vis Pakistan.”