The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 29 September 1989 describes the latest developments in China, Tunisia, the Soviet Union, Ecuador, Peru, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Philippines, Indonesia, Iran, and Brazil.

With the term “weapons of mass destruction” having not yet fully come into general usage, this NIE used the term “special weapons” to describe nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (formerly the term “special weapons” was sometimes used to describe nuclear weapons only). With numerous excisions, including the names of some countries in the sections on “East Asia and the Pacific” and “Central America,” this wide-ranging estimate provides broad-brushed, sometimes superficial, pictures of the situations in numerous countries along with coverage of international controls to halt sensitive technology exports to suspect countries.

With proliferation becoming a “greater threat to US interests over the next five years,” intelligence analysts believed that the “disruptive aspect of the proliferation phenomenon will constitute the greater threat to the United States.” While the estimators saw “low potential” for terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons, the likelihood of terrorist/extortionist hoaxes was on the upswing. Significant portions of the NIE are excised, especially the estimate of Israel’s nuclear arsenal and its impact in the Middle East. Nevertheless, much information remains on the countries of greatest concern: Iraq and Libya in the Near East, India and Pakistan in South Asia, Brazil and Argentina in Latin America, and the Republic of South Africa, as well as those of lesser concern: Iran, Egypt, Taiwan and the two Koreas.

Memo to President Figueiredo dealing with the arrest and inadequate treatment applied to three employees of Mendes Jr., a Brazilian company operating in civil construction projects in Iraq, and efforts—mostly frustrated—by Brazilian diplomats to resolve the issue.

In a memo to President Figueiredo, Minister Saraiva Guerreiro advises that Brazil should demonstrate receptivity to Iraq’s proposal but avoid a formal commitment, especially in “sensitive” areas that relate to the Germany-Brazil Agreement. Supply of uranium should be admitted as a possibility if mentioned by the Iraqis. The document emphasizes that the cooperation should be made public and become subject to all international safeguard agreements and regimes.

In separate replies regarding Iraq's overtures, both Foreign Minister Silveira and Secretary-General of the National Security Council Gustavo Rego Reis suggest that Brazil should not decline explicitly, but avoid making commitments on this issue. General Reis emphasizes Saddam Hussein’s “leftist inclinations” and his ties to the socialist camp and the extensiveness of the proposed agreement. He notes that Brazil had already rejected proposals by Uruguay, Chile and Libya. Silveira merely requested additional time to study the proposal.

Minister of Mines and Energy, Shigeaki Ueki, reports to the Secretary-General of the National Security Council, General Gustavo Rego Reis, and to the Foreign Minister, Azeredo da Silveira, the requests made by Iraqi officials in 1978 and the stage of negotiations on the subject. He emphasizes the high value placed by Iraq on the matter and the increased relevance of Iraq as an oil-supplier and recommends that Brazil should satisfy Iraq’s demand.

This internal memo describes Brazil’s relations with oil producers as of 1976. It highlights the importance of Iraq as an oil supplier and the necessity of expanding exports to reduce the deficit in bilateral trade.

Just a few months into President Reagan’s first term his administration wanted to make its own mark on nonproliferation policy. The report suggests building “broader bilateral relationship[s]” and offering political and security incentives could persuade states considering developing nuclear weapons to cease these efforts.