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Nuclear Proliferation

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August 13, 1982	Memorandum for the President [Ronald Reagan] from Secretary Weinberger, ‘Weekly Report of Defense Activities’ Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger openly conveyed his dismay toward the Israeli leadership, expressing his support for the opposition, led by Shimon Peres.
January 8, 1982	Memorandum for the President [Ronald Reagan] from Secretary Weinberger, ‘Weekly Report to the President’ In a memorandum for the president from January 1982, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger expressed his criticism of Israel’s Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon and his tendency of “going public whenever it suits him”.
June 12, 1981	Memorandum for the President [Ronald Reagan] from Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., ‘U.S. Strategy for UN Security Council Meeting on the Israeli Raid on the Iraqi Nuclear Facility’ This document outlines Haig's proposed political strategy, which was approved by Reagan on 12 June, and was constructed around the notion of red lines: Washington would harshly condemn Israel but would also “draw the line on punishment” by Israel.
June 11, 1981	Memorandum for the National Security Council from Richard V. Allen, ‘National Security Council Meeting (NSC), Friday, June 12, 1981, 11:00 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.’ ACDA Director-Designate Eugene Rostow explains his pro-Israel stance, and argues that Israel should be given an exemption from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty.
June 9, 1981	Memorandum for Richard V. Allen from Douglas J. Feith, ‘Israeli Raid on Iraqi Nuclear Facility’ NSC staffer Douglas J. Feith took the internal debate on the legitimacy of the raid a step further, stating that “no rebuke of Israel’s raid against Iraq should be issued without an equally emphatic rebuke of Iraq.” Feith’s argument was based on the fact that Iraq had continuously refused to acknowledge Israel’s existence and was officially at war with it.
June 9, 1981	Memorandum for Richard V. Allen from Raymond Tanter, 'Israel's Air Strike on Iraq's Nuclear Facility' The NSC’s Raymond Tanter recommended a “middle course of action,” one which would distance Washington from the strike “while avoiding extreme measures designed to punish Israel.”
June 15, 1981	Memorandum for the President [Ronald Reagan] from Walter J. Stoessel, ‘Political Strategy for Responding to Israeli Attack’ Following Lewis’ cable, and the realization that the raid should have been at least somewhat anticipated, the administration opted to develop a more restrained, sober approach towards Israel, constructing what was termed a “political strategy for responding to Israeli attack”.
June 9, 1981	Cable, American Embassy Tel Aviv to the Secretary of State, ‘Israeli Strike on Iraqi Nuclear Facility: Background for the Decision’ While starting to construct the political strategy of response to the raid, the administration came face to face with what U.S. ambassador to Israel, Sam Lewis called in his cable to Washington a “gap” in the administration’s “institutional memory”, as assessments regarding Israel’s intention to launch a strike were not passed on from the Carter administration.
June 11, 1981	Cable from Indian Embassy Baghdad to Foreign Ministry in Delhi Indian diplomats speculated at the time that the suspension of the delivery of the F-16 jets was potentially a U.S. gesture of goodwill toward Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, aimed at appeasing him and keeping the embryonic peace process with Israel alive.
June 15, 1981	Memorandum for the President [Ronald Reagan] from Richard V. Allen, ‘Political Strategy for Responding to Israeli Attack’ National Security Advisor Richard V. Allen informed Reagan that the administration was “not required to make a legal determination on whether Israel violated U.S. law” and commented that the issue of the raid was “to be treated as a political rather than a legal question.”