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Documents

July 9, 1963

Report by Ambassador Quaroni to Minister of Foreign Affairs Piccioni, 'General De Martino's candidacy and Standing Group'

Italian Ambassador to London, Quaroni, analyzes the internal situation of NATO, and Italy's standing that he considers very weak. He describes the situation as "total Cold War" between US and France, where Kennedy and De Gaulle have different visions for the future.

June 28, 1963

Report by Permanent Representative to NATO Alessandrini to Minister of Foreign Affairs Piccioni

In this report to Foreign Minister Piccioni, Alessandrini addresses the key problems with NATO, focusing on the lack of internal cohesion . He names the German problem as the most important issue of the alliance, but touches also on De Gaulle's politics and European integration.

May 2, 1961

Memorandum by General Staff of Defense (SMD) for Minister of Defense Andreotti

Document announcing the official abandonment of the policy of massive retaliation as a "deterrence" strategy. Opinion of the Italian senior minister of defense regarding the need for a more flexible NATO defense strategy in order to respond to any type of act of aggression is also presented.

April 27, 1961

Message by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate General for Political Affairs and Security (DGAP), 'NATO strategy. Conversation between our Ambassador in London and Lord Home'

Letter recounting a meeting between the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the British Foreign Secretary regarding NATO’s weapons development. Nuclear weapons should never be employed unless absolutely necessary and instead serve as an intimidation tactic to deter Soviet aggression. The necessity of increasing NATO’s arsenal of conventional weapons to match that of the Soviets was also stressed.

April 1, 1961

Memorandum by Admiral Corrado Tagliamonte to the Minister of Defense, 'American attitude toward NATO. President Kennedy's declarations'

Report submitted to the Italian Minister of Defense regarding President Kennedy’s opinion that NATO should not construct a special nuclear force since the US has already developed a nuclear deterrent. According to the Kennedy, the creation of an additional deterrent would be useless and a waste of resources.

March 8, 1961

Note Assessing Italian Strategic Vulnerability

Evaluation of vulnerability to Soviet aggression due to Italy’s geographic location (the middle of the Mediterranean Ocean) and political position (mostly communist). Reporting on the decision to increase nuclear weapons as well as bolster the air force in order to protect Italy and surrounding Mediterranean countries, which becomes essential considering the Soviet Union has made open threats directed at Europe and NATO.

October 29, 1960

General Staff of Defense (SMD) Report, 'NATO military problems. Ten-year plan'

Report on France’s plan to establish a policy of autonomic thermonuclear dissuasion and an analysis of the negative effects such a plan would have, including weakening of the NATO shield and increased risk of nuclear attack on Western Europe.

May 28, 1960

Ministry of Defense Memorandum to the Minister of Defense Andreotti, 'Tripartite Military Agreement'

A collection of progress reports from the sub-commissions of the Accordo Military Tripartito F-I-G of 1957, a military alliance between Italy, France, and Germany, summarizing achievements and future objectives regarding development of co-owned nuclear weapons.

October 19, 1990

Telegram by Permanent Representative to NATO Fulci to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Transfer to Crotone of the 401st Formation of US Air Force'

Short telegram in which Fulci reports his conversation with his US counterpart about the recent decision on the Crotone airbase. Taft described the episode as a "parliamentary ambush" and reiterated the US administration's determination to do everything possible to safeguard the strategically important project.

October 24, 1985

Memorandum by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Legal status of the Sigonella base'

This short memo discusses the legal framework around the use of Sigonella airbase during the Achille Lauro incident concluding that the landing had not been granted the required authorization by Italians.

Pagination