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Documents

June 23, 1990

National Intelligence Daily for Saturday, 23 June 1990

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for Saturday, 23 June 1990 describes the latest developments in USSR, Yugoslavia, Palestine, West Germany and South Africa.

June 28, 1990

National Intelligence Daily for Thursday, 28 June 1990

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 28 June 1990 describes the latest developments in Liberia, the Soviet Union, Israel, Japan, France, Italy and Taiwan.

July 31, 1990

National Intelligence Daily for Tuesday, 31 July 1990

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 31 July 1990 describes the latest developments in Japan, the Soviet Union, European Community, Liberia, Islamic States, Egypt, Fiji and Vietnam.

July 28, 1990

National Intelligence Daily for Saturday, 28 July 1990

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 28 July 1990 describes the latest developments in Persian Gulf, Liberia, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Poland, Papua New Guinea, China, Zaire, OPEC, Haiti and South Africa.

May 24, 1972

[Report on Warsaw Pact] Presentation about the information (intelligence) concerning Warsaw Pact's military potential, explained at the meeting of NATO Defence Planning Committee
(Bruxelles, 24th May 1972)

This rather technical document compares the strategic capabilities (conventional and nuclear) of Warsaw Pact and NATO. The document notes that Warsaw Pact has considerably increased its capabilities catching up with the West, and raises the question about Soviet intentions, and whether continuing armament is in line with peaceful coexistence.

March 3, 1967

Research Memorandum REU-14 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'How Major NATO Countries View the Prospect of an ABM Deployment'

Despite new information that the Soviet Union was deploying anti-ballistic missile defenses around Moscow, the United States had not yet decided to deploy its own ABM defenses (although a decision would be made later in the year) and there was some hope that U.S.-Soviet talks would prevent an ABM race. If, however, talks failed, some NATO allies worried about the “adverse consequences” of an ABM race, especially whether having an ABM system might incline Washington toward risk taking.

June 5, 1963

Research Memorandum REU-44 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Evidence of Satisfaction or Dissatisfaction in European NATO Countries with the Lack of a Share in Ownership or Control of Nuclear Weapons'

Ambassador Livingston Merchant, who was responsible for the U.S. diplomatic effort to win support for the MLF, asked INR to report on the degree to which non-nuclear European members of NATO were satisfied with their “lack of a share in ownership or control of nuclear weapons.” Based on the evidence, mainly various statements made by leading politicians, diplomats, and policymakers, INR experts concluded that most of the countries surveyed (Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Greece) were “relatively satisfied,” while only West Germany was “restive” to the extent that some of its officials were interested in a NATO or European nuclear force.

January 31, 1962

Research Memorandum REU-25 from Roger Hilsman to Mr. Kohler, 'European Attitudes on Independent Nuclear Capability'

Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”

October 2, 1947

Report from Bulgarian Intelligence on the Situation in the Mediterranean

A report on the Western European military plans for fighting back a possible Soviet invasion. The report looks into the political climate in Italy and the public support for the plans.

June 2007

Coordination of Soviet and Czechoslovak Intelligence Operations. Folder 80. The Chekist Anthology.

This folder consists of a detailed operational plan for cooperation between the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB for the years 1975-1978. Specific objectives include penetrating the military, political, and economic establishments of the United States, Britain, West Germany, France, and NATO, impeding the activities of the Czech Congress of National Development (KNR), collecting information on “Zionist intrigues,” gathering scientific/technical information on Western achievements in the fields of biological, chemical, and thermonuclear weapons, and using active measures to curtail the activities of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in West Germany.