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South America

Brazil

Executive Committee of the National Security Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Cuban Missile Crisis

Cuba's National Capitol Building, January 2010.

Central America and Caribbean

Cuba

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

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Bastian Pinto, Luiz Leivas

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Brazil. Embassy (Cuba)

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Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

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Eastern Europe

Yugoslavia

Fidel Castro, 1959.

Castro, Fidel

1926- 2016

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Roa, Raúl

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United Nations

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Campos, Roberto de Oliveira

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Photograph of Secretary General of the United Nations U Thant

Thant, U

1909- 1974

President Ronald Reagan, Vice-President Bush, and oviet General Secretary Gorbachev

United States-Soviet Relations

Sino-Soviet Relations

Sino-Soviet Split, 1960-1984

Cuban Foreign Relations

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October 31, 1962	Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Mexico (Vlahov) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry Yugoslav officials remark that significant publicity and acknowledgment was given to Tito’s message and initiative in regard to Brazilian President João Goulart’s messages, and Yugoslavia's activity in the UNO [United Nations Organization] has solidified their reputation as that of the nonaligned.
October 30, 1962	Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry Fidel Castro, after his first contacts with Brazilian President João Goulart’s special envoy Albino Silva, accepted well the Brazilian thesis which contains following: Denuclearization of the whole of Latin America and the embargo on atomic weapons delivery; Inspection by UN; Cuba would commit neither to export revolution nor to carry out any subversive activities; Cuba would be given guarantees for keeping its sovereignty and independence. The USA will accept the plan after negotiations. Russians “couldn’t think of anything better.”
October 30, 1962	Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry Vidaković speaks with Brazilian ambassador Luis Bastian Pinto on Brazil's role in the Cuban Missile Crisis negotiations and Fidel's argument for Cuban sovereignty and independence.
November 3, 1962	Telegram from Yugoslav Foreign Ministry to Yugoslav Embassies in Washington, Havana, Mexico, Caracas, and LaPaz, and Missions in Santiago de Chile, Montevideo, and New York City (United Nations) A message from the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry (originally, the embassy in Rio), saying that they are extremely satisfied with Tito’s message which contributed to Brazilian President João Goulart’s decisiveness on Cuban crisis.
October 30, 1962	Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry Vidakovic describes one of his (daily) meetings with Raul Roa. They discuss Cuban independence, U Thant and relations with Brazil.
October 29, 1962	Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry Vidaković reports to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry on the diplomatic efforts of many Cuban officials (Roa, Dorticos, etc.). Vidakovic is worried they might not be approaching the situation (the Cuban Missile Crisis) with the appropriate fervor, which might, he believes, lead to a hysterical over-reaction at some point.
October 28, 1962	Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry Foreign Minister Raúl Roa said to the Yugoslavian official that Fidel’s last declaration (his 5 point statement on 28 October) was directed more at Khrushchev than to Kennedy.
October 28, 1962	Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry Barišić is forwarding a message from Brazilian President João Goulart to Yugoslavian President Tito. The body of the message contains his thoughts on both Brazil and Yugoslavia's involvement in the Cuban Missile Crisis and also his hopes that negotiations can reach a settlement that will both retain Cuba's right to self-determination and also proceed with the denuclearization efforts of Latin America.
October 27, 1962	Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry A telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry about a meeting with Brazilian President João Goulart. Barišić says Goulart considers that everything must be done to prevent the beginning of war, because war would bring unpredictable catastrophe and it would be hard to extinguish it if war operations start. Goulart also shares his opinion that negotiations are necessary, and that Cuba must be prevented from becoming an atomic base for it could be the constant cause of war dangers.
October 26, 1962	Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Jeneiro (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry Yugoslav Foreign Minister Koča Popović talks with Brazilian Foreign Ministry official Carlos A. Bernardes about the situation of the Cuban Missile Crisis. They are afraid that euphoria could make the US intensify a conflict that could lead to invasion, because the US ambassador [Lincoln Gordon] claims constantly that the solution to this crisis is not only disarmament of Cuba, but also liquidation of Fidel’s regime.