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Brazil Foreign Relations of the United States Clear All

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South America

Brazil

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Cuba's National Capitol Building, January 2010.

Central America and Caribbean

Cuba

Executive Committee of the National Security Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Cuban Missile Crisis

Brazilian Nuclear History

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Eastern Europe

Yugoslavia

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

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South America

Argentina

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Campos, Roberto de Oliveira

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Bastian Pinto, Luiz Leivas

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Goulart, João

1918- 1976

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Brazil. Embassy (Cuba)

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Origins of Brazil-Argentina Nuclear Cooperation

Fidel Castro, 1959.

Castro, Fidel

1926- 2016

Josip Broz Tito, 1961

Tito, Josip Broz

1892- 1980

Nuclear Proliferation

Cuban Foreign Relations

Conversations with Mao Zedong

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November 2, 1962	Telegram from Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, Belgrade, to Yugoslav Embassies in Havana and Washington and the Yugoslav Mission to the United Nations, New York The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry relays to its embassies a summary of the Brazilian proposal on the Cuban Missile Crisis which, they say, mainly includes: the denuclearization of Latin America with inspections, Cuba's commitment to not "export" revolutionary operations, and guarantees to Cuba for sovereignty and independence. Allegedly, Castro welcomed the idea of the above plan. Brazil thinks that the USA could accept it after negotiations.
October 31, 1962	Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Mexico (Vlahov) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry Yugoslav officials remark that significant publicity and acknowledgment was given to Tito’s message and initiative in regard to Brazilian President João Goulart’s messages, and Yugoslavia's activity in the UNO [United Nations Organization] has solidified their reputation as that of the nonaligned.
October 30, 1962	Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry Fidel Castro, after his first contacts with Brazilian President João Goulart’s special envoy Albino Silva, accepted well the Brazilian thesis which contains following: Denuclearization of the whole of Latin America and the embargo on atomic weapons delivery; Inspection by UN; Cuba would commit neither to export revolution nor to carry out any subversive activities; Cuba would be given guarantees for keeping its sovereignty and independence. The USA will accept the plan after negotiations. Russians “couldn’t think of anything better.”
November 3, 1962	Telegram from Yugoslav Foreign Ministry to Yugoslav Embassies in Washington, Havana, Mexico, Caracas, and LaPaz, and Missions in Santiago de Chile, Montevideo, and New York City (United Nations) A message from the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry (originally, the embassy in Rio), saying that they are extremely satisfied with Tito’s message which contributed to Brazilian President João Goulart’s decisiveness on Cuban crisis.
October 28, 1962	Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry Barišić is forwarding a message from Brazilian President João Goulart to Yugoslavian President Tito. The body of the message contains his thoughts on both Brazil and Yugoslavia's involvement in the Cuban Missile Crisis and also his hopes that negotiations can reach a settlement that will both retain Cuba's right to self-determination and also proceed with the denuclearization efforts of Latin America.
October 27, 1962	Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry A telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry about a meeting with Brazilian President João Goulart. Barišić says Goulart considers that everything must be done to prevent the beginning of war, because war would bring unpredictable catastrophe and it would be hard to extinguish it if war operations start. Goulart also shares his opinion that negotiations are necessary, and that Cuba must be prevented from becoming an atomic base for it could be the constant cause of war dangers.
October 26, 1962	Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Jeneiro (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry Yugoslav Foreign Minister Koča Popović talks with Brazilian Foreign Ministry official Carlos A. Bernardes about the situation of the Cuban Missile Crisis. They are afraid that euphoria could make the US intensify a conflict that could lead to invasion, because the US ambassador [Lincoln Gordon] claims constantly that the solution to this crisis is not only disarmament of Cuba, but also liquidation of Fidel’s regime.
October 25, 1962	Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry A telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry describing Vidaković's meeting with Brazilian Ambassador Pinto. They mostly discussed the Cuban crisis in relation to decisions made in the Organization of American States (OAS) councils.
October 25, 1962	Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry A telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry about meeting with Brazilian officials to discuss the US preparing a military invasion of Cuba.
October 24, 1962	Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry A telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry discussing the Cuban Missile Crisis and U.S.-USSR-Cuban relations. It says, the "American arguments in favor of the military blockade of Cuba are: firstly, they have solid proof that Cuba will get atomic weapons; secondly, Kennedy must take more severe measures because of the internal pressure, that’s why his option is blockade, although he is trying to transfer this issue to the UNO [United Nations Organization] in order to alleviate the pressure on himself; thirdly, transferring Cuba’s issue to the UNO he is creating a precedent against unilateral USSR actions in Berlin."