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October 24, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

A telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry relaying a message from "Brazilian Ambassador in Washington [Roberto de Oliveira Campos] says that the USA is getting ready for military intervention in Cuba. The approximate plan is that US planes will start bombing Cuba in the places where there are alleged bases with nuclear weapons and that will be as soon as Cuba refuses to accept the UN Commission for disarmament."

November 1, 1962

Telegram from Israeli Embassy in Havana (Prato), to Israeli Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem

Prato and Pinto discuss Brazilian efforts to pursuade Cuba to accept inspectors as well as what a potential U.S. attack would mean for diplomatic relations in the region.

November 14, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 3:15 p.m., Wednesday

The tight secrecy continues to surround the conversations with Anastas Mikoyan, however in a conversation with Pinto, he reveals information concerning: Fidel Castro, Cuban-Soviet relations during the crisis and Cuba's refusal to submit to international inspections.

November 10, 1962

Telegram-Letter from Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 10-13 November 1962

In conversation with a high officials from the State Department about the prospects of the Cuban situation, three hypotheses about the future Soviet comportment are discussed: 1) abandon entirely the government of Fidel Castro to its own fate; 2) limit itself to leave constituted in Cuba a socialist regime, based on a well-structured communist party and endowed with a repressive political machine, as a political base of propaganda and infiltration in Latin America and 3) to intensify Soviet technical and economic assistance in a manner to transform Cuba into a living demonstration of the efficacy of communism as an instrument of economic development in Latin America. The letter goes on to describe these three points in more detail.

November 7, 1962

Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 5:30 p.m., Wednesday

Pinto describes the current situation in Cuba from the perspective of the Brazilian Embassy in Havana. He says, "The country continues entirely mobilized for the defense. The attitude of the Government seems to be more cautious. Habituated for years of the threat and with the blockade in front of Havana, the revolutionary government is plainly conscious that the danger has not passed and can reemerge at any moment."

November 5, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 4:45 p.m., Monday

Pinto describes two recent speeches, one by Kennedy the other by Castro, and appears to give more credit and praise to the speech by Castro. He also discusses the Cuban crisis situation in general.

November 5, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Moscow (da Cunha), 4:15 p.m., Monday

Brazil's embassy in Moscow discusses visits by Novotny, Ulbricht and Gomulka to Moscow and says that there is the impression that the recent international events have created a state of disorientation in the community of socialist countries and that the great challenge of Khrushchev will be to accommodate this state of affairs in the short term.

November 5, 1962

Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Warsaw (Valente), 4 p.m., Monday

The Brazilian Embassy in Poland discusses Poland's sympathy on the Brazilian motion in the United Nations about the denuclearization and its favorable reflection in a solution of the Cuban crisis.

November 1, 1962

Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 7 p.m., Thursday

Campos discusses diplomatic gestures between Brazil, the United States and Cuba during the Cuban crisis and some misunderstandings that may have emerged during that time.

October 31, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 6:30 p.m., Wednesday

The Brazilian government offers elements of their Armed Forces for collaboration in the blockade of Cuba, authorized by the OAS and executed by the American government. Brazil does so for three reasons: their affirmative vote on the blockade in the OAS, most Latin American countries have contributed armed forces and it is a gesture of cooperate with the United States.

Pagination