The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 29 December 1989 describes the latest developments in Panama, Romania, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Brazil, Lebanon, Chile, and Poland.

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 29 September 1989 describes the latest developments in China, Tunisia, the Soviet Union, Ecuador, Peru, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Philippines, Indonesia, Iran, and Brazil.

This SNIE analyzes Brazilian nuclear politics in the light of the return of civilian rule in the country after 21 years of military rule. It demonstrates a profound knowledge of the military's involvement in the nuclear program.

This is an Intelligence Report regarding Brazil’s nuclear activities prepared by the Argentine Navy, which seeks to estimate Brazil’s nuclear intentions in the near future. It is mainly based on newspaper articles as well as declarations of Brazilian high-ranked scientists, diplomats and military officials.

The SNIEs from 1983 and the 1985 update emphasize Brazil’s quest for technological-industrial autonomy which in nuclear terms meant developing an indigenous program to master the fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities. In seeking those objectives, Brazil did not want to face any constraints, and its leaders were unresponsive to US or other pressures for safeguards on nuclear facilities. According to the 1985 report the prominent role of the military in nuclear activities, “the direction of Brazil’s nuclear r&d,” and the CNEN president’s “reputation of favoring a nuclear option” posed a “danger to US interests in Brazil.”

Argentina, like its neighbor, Brazil, was determined to develop an “independent nuclear fuel cycle,” with the capacity to reprocess plutonium and enrich uranium. Also like Brazil, Argentina was one of the few Latin American countries to refuse to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Thus, Argentina’s nuclear activities were under routine scrutiny to see if they involved anything that suggested an interest in a weapons capability. US intelligence agencies continued to monitor developments but perspectives shifted as Argentina’s domestic politics evolved. Prepared after the Argentine-British conflict over the Falklands Islands, in which Washington helped London, this special estimate professed “great uncertainty” over Argentina’s nuclear intentions. While “emotionally” the Argentine military leadership was interested in a weapons option, it had “reduced capability to fulfill this desire.”