Summary of the meeting of the leaders of the Warsaw Pact. The document is not signed, but it is highly likely it was authorized by Ferenc Somogyi, Deputy Minister of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was present at the meeting in Moscow.

A catalog of indicators of NATO preparation for nuclear war that were monitored by Warsaw Pact intelligence services under Project RYaN. The activity is divided into the following areas: political and military, activities of intelligence services, civil defense, and economic.

The CC CPSU announces that it is breaking off negotiations with the US and NATO on Strategic Arms Reduction.

The CC CPSU announces that it is breaking off negotiations with the US and NATO on Strategic Arms Reduction.

János Kádár presents on his diplomatic trip to Moscow to the Hungarian Central Committee. Kádár first places the Cuban Missile Crisis in context. This includes describing the success of the Cuban revolution, US aggression towards Cuba, and the Cuban-Soviet military and defense agreement, which ultimately spawned the US’s unilateral military mobilization. Kádár then describes the Soviet Union’s strategy to achieve two goals: protect the Cuban revolution and preserve peace. He notes that Cuba and the Soviet Union disagree about how the crisis was resolved, but asks the congress of workers to show complete support of Soviet actions and successes.

The document includes Hungarian Council of Ministers meeting minutes from 25 October 1962. The minutes are dominated by János Kádár’s detailed overview of events leading up to the current international situation. The overview is preceded by the Council of Ministers approving the government’s public statement on the Cuban Missille Crisis. During the session Kádár summarizes US provocation, Cuban and Soviet responses, and the military mobilization of different countries and military alliances, and Hungary’s political campaign in support of Cuba. Kádár notes negotiations between Cuba, the US, and Soviet Union initiate the day before. The minutes also include exchanges between Kádár and other Council of Ministers representatives.

Summary of Romanian position on the Euromissiles Crisis presented at October 1983 summit and also shared with the United States via a letter from Nicolae Ceauşescu to President Ronald Reagan.The Ceauşescu – Reagan letter underscored that: (1) Romania did not approve of the Soviet missile deployments; (2) noted that Romania would only participate in defense operations, and specified that it would carefully consider the nature of the call for assistance by fellow alliance members before sending its troops outside of Romanian territory; (3) stressed that the Romanian Armed Forces were fully under national control, giving several specific details on how this was guaranteed; and (4) explicitly noted that Romania did not and would not ever host nuclear missiles on its territory, whether from the Soviet Union or the United States.

Prime Minister Ion Gheorghe Maurer describes Romania's new policies and approach to relations with China and the Soviet Union at a time when Romania was increasingly attempting to distance itself from the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union's military control. Toward this end, Mauer proclaims a policy of military disengagement and disarmament, declaring that mediation and negotiation are the only legitimate way of resolving international tensions.

French diplomat Lucien Paye assesses Chinese foreign policy in the aftermath of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and speculates that China wishes to exploit differences within the NATO camp.

On 5 July 1963 the Bulgarian Ministry of Internal Affairs completed an information report on NATO's activity during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the report, the ministry outlines detailed espionage carried out by NATO agents. According to the report, the NATO Military Intelligence Services provided instructions for NATO member-states' military attaches stationed in Warsaw Pact countries and agents they could get to cooperate with them. Agents were to observe and report specific military intelligence collecting in Warsaw Pact countries -- arms deliveries, missile sites, military movements, etc. The report also includes explanation of how the attaches carried out their intelligence gathering -- reading official press, speaking in Russian and misrepresenting themselves as Russian, etc . The Bulgarian Interior Ministry notes that Western governments were well-informed of Bulgarian military structures -- including exact formations and secret designations.