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October 23, 1962	Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 23 October 1962 In a conversation with Charles Bartlett (a journalist who had befriended President Kennedy), Drozniak learns more of the Cuban Crisis situation and of US-USSR relations, including that the steps taken to address the crisis (the quarentine of Cuba) were implemented by Kennedy in the atmosphere of great pressure from the public opinion.
October 20, 1962	Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak) Drozniak compiles information he has collected from US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William R. Tyler and US Ambassador at Large Llewellyn E. Thompson on the rising Cuban situation and US-USSR relations.
October 18, 1962	Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 18 October 1962 Drozniak forwards a report from US Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs [Edwin M.] Martin. Martin says that the Americans are well-informed of the military situation in Cuba, that Cuba does not possess nuclear weapons (nor will they be likely to because the USSR did not give such weapons to China, so why would they give them to Cuba?), that the level of the Cuban economy is twenty-five percent lower than the period before Fidel Castro came to power and Cuba is much more economically dependent on the USSR, and finally that any military invasion or complete blockade of Cuba would be considered an act of war by the USSR.
October 18, 1962	Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 18 October 1962 Drozniak discusses the possibility of US military action against Cuba, as well as Cuba's foreign relations with the USSR and the US.
November 2, 1962	Telegram from Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, Belgrade, to Yugoslav Embassies in Havana and Washington and the Yugoslav Mission to the United Nations, New York The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry relays to its embassies a summary of the Brazilian proposal on the Cuban Missile Crisis which, they say, mainly includes: the denuclearization of Latin America with inspections, Cuba's commitment to not "export" revolutionary operations, and guarantees to Cuba for sovereignty and independence. Allegedly, Castro welcomed the idea of the above plan. Brazil thinks that the USA could accept it after negotiations.
October 30, 1962	Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry Fidel Castro, after his first contacts with Brazilian President João Goulart’s special envoy Albino Silva, accepted well the Brazilian thesis which contains following: Denuclearization of the whole of Latin America and the embargo on atomic weapons delivery; Inspection by UN; Cuba would commit neither to export revolution nor to carry out any subversive activities; Cuba would be given guarantees for keeping its sovereignty and independence. The USA will accept the plan after negotiations. Russians “couldn’t think of anything better.”
October 24, 1962	Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry A telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry discussing the Cuban Missile Crisis and U.S.-USSR-Cuban relations. It says, the "American arguments in favor of the military blockade of Cuba are: firstly, they have solid proof that Cuba will get atomic weapons; secondly, Kennedy must take more severe measures because of the internal pressure, that’s why his option is blockade, although he is trying to transfer this issue to the UNO [United Nations Organization] in order to alleviate the pressure on himself; thirdly, transferring Cuba’s issue to the UNO he is creating a precedent against unilateral USSR actions in Berlin."
October 30, 1962	Cable from Swiss observer at the United Nations (Thalmann) A telegram from the Swiss observer to the United Nations (Thalmann) about recent actions - the negotiation of ICRC participation in Cuba, the removal of the quarantine and the Soviet Union has declared that it would be willing to let representatives of the ICRC inspect its ships bound for Cuba.
November 14, 1962	Memorandum of Large-Group Meeting of FRG Chancellor Adenauer and US President Kennedy, Washington A record of the large group meeting between U.S. President Kennedy, the F.R.G. Chancellor Adenauer and others in which they discuss the results of the Cuban Missile Crisis, that the situation as a whole is still ongoing, and what needs to be done to restore security to the situation.
November 14, 1962	West German Record of One-on-One Conversation between FRG Chancellor Adenauer and US President Kennedy, Washington F.R.G. Chancellor Adenauer and U.S. President Kennedy discuss the Cuban crisis and the sense they both have that the situation is not yet entirely resolved. "The President indicates that one never knows what’s going on in the Soviets’ heads. The Americans never thought that the Soviets would dare bring missiles to Cuba and the Soviets never thought that the Americans would react so decisively. Both sides had false ideas about each other…"