A telegram from the Mexican Embassy in Cuba describing that the government of Cuba had given the order to be at battle stations to all its armed forces in anticipation of an air attack against Cuba by the United States.

A telegram from the Mexican Embassy in Cuba describing the incorrect facts that have been reported by the press lately, regarding commercial maritime traffic between Cuba and other socialist countries and counterrevolutionary forces.

Report which outlines the activity of leftist opposition movements in Nicaragua in their attempt to overthrow the rule of Somoza. The text gives an account of the support which various leftist opposition organizations have received from neighboring countries. According to the information, the following groups have overtly expressed discontent with the ruling regime: The Democratic Union for Liberation, the “Group of Twelve,” the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement, and the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). Those movements have been supported politically, financially, and in some instances with military aid, by the governments of Venezuela, Mexico, Panama, Costa Rica, and Cuba. The text suggests that two factors have contributed to the escalating tension in Nicaragua – the internal struggle against the regime combined with pressures from outside, coming mainly from the USA, to keep the regime in place.

Describes training techniques used by the KGB in logistical preparation of their operatives for assignments abroad. This article focuses on the employment history of the KGB agent codenamed “Halef.” Between 1955 and 1967, Halef was stationed in Hong Kong and Tokyo. In 1967, due to his insignificant feedback and a weak performance as a field operative, Halef was transferred back as a trainer. As a trainer, Halef traveled extensively. While in the United States, the KGB developed a fictitious identity for Halef – a so-called legend-biography – in case his activity aroused suspicion and he were detained by authorities. In the United States, France and Mexico, Halef’s objectives included developing and testing means of communication with the KGB, which could be used to inform the KGB of an operative’s arrival to and departure from a country, request a meeting, or announce an emergency. In addition to assessing the existing signal language used among operatives, the KGB also instructed Halef to collect the data necessary to set up new surveillance locations in a number of countries. In 1977, Halef was performing assignments in Pakistan and Burma. In 1978, he and his wife were engaged in assignments throughout the USSR. From the USSR, they were relocated to the GDR and then to Bulgaria, where they boarded a cruise ship going from Varny to Suhumi to survey the ports of the Black Sea basin. Traveling through Odessa, Halef photographed military vessels and observed the procedures of the border patrol and customs officers.

Comrade Josef Houska submits a document concerning issues related to cooperation with the Cuban intelligence service especially the Operation MANUEL to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The Operational MANUEL started in 1962 when the Cuban intelligence asked the Czechoslovak resident in Havana to arrange a transit through Prague for Venezuelan nationals who underwent guerrilla training in Cuba. In 1964 talks were held between Cuban and Czechoslovak intelligence services but no formal agreement of the tasks and responsibilities was concluded between the two. The Soviet government was informed about the Operation MANUEL and stated its agreement with the project. Houska says that the main objective of the operation is the education and training of revolutionary cadres from Latin America and the organization of combat groups. Participants of the operation were not confined to cadres from among the ranks of communist parties but also included members from various nationalist and anti-American groupings. The routes of individual participants in the operation were determined by the Cuban intelligence service who mainly directed the Operation MANUEL. Houska says problems that arisen in the course of the operation were solved in collaboration with Cuban and the Soviet authorities. The document cautioned about counter-espionage institutions' increasing interests in the operation and the fact that the US intelligence service agents were among the operation participants. Houska says refusal to offer assistance would have a negative impact on Cuba and Czechoslovakia would lose control over the operation.

Information summarizing the objectives of a visit of the FSLN delegation, headed by Baiardo Arse [name is spelled phonetically], to Bulgaria. The visit, which took place from 28 June to July 3 1983, aimed at exchanging information and ideas on ways to reform FSLN, in order to transform the Front into an avant-garde Marxist-Leninist party.
The document describes the political and economic pressure exerted by the Reagan administration on a number of Central and Latin American countries, in order to decrease the support for the Front and other leftist revolutionary movements. According to the information FSLN responded to these measures by consolidating and strengthening its army, and national militia; maintaining transparency and political pluralism; strengthening the cooperative and state economic sector, and redirecting trade to new markets, mainly in the socialist community.

Letter from Stalin to Mao stating the position the USSR will take regarding the Mexican UN proposal, and stating his agreement with Mao regarding the issues of POW repatriation and diplomatic exchanges with India and Burma.