Gang Ryang-uk and Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai meet but fail to reach a consensus on Korean unification and the Kashmir issue.

State Department talking points for analyzing the issue of a potential Indian Nuclear Test. These talking points review the state of play after Ambassador Wisner’s demarche to the Indian Foreign Ministry. Recognizing Prime Minister Rao’s cautiousness, US government officials did not believe that he had made a decision to test, but they were aware that he was under great pressure to do so. Therefore, the U.S. government was working with allies, encouraging them “to urge India not to test.” Parallel discussions were taking place with the Pakistanis over the production of enriched uranium over above the 3 to five 5 percent level that could be used to fuel nuclear reactors. The Pakistanis were denying that they were producing highly enriched uranium but intelligence reports suggested that they were contemplating such action or had already begun the process.

The State Department writes to Islamabad urging Pakistan to not react if in fact India chooses to launch a nuclear test. On 15 December the New York Times published a story by Tim Weiner, under the headline “US Suspects India Prepares to Conduct Nuclear Test.” While some Indian journalists and policy experts were convinced that the story was a US government plant, Weiner had simply used due diligence in pursuing a lead from a non-government expert on nuclear proliferation issues. Worried that the story would exacerbate regional tensions by encouraging Pakistan to “act in a manner that jeopardizes our nonproliferation efforts in South Asia,” the Department wanted to enlist the Chinese to encourage the Pakistanis to “exercise restraint in response to these reports.”

Chinese report on a speech by the Pakistani Foreign Minister concerning bringing the Kashmir issue to the UN Security Council, Pakistan's relations with Muslim countries, the Southeast Asian Defense Treaty and the Baghdad Pact, the possibility of Pakistan joining the Suez Canal Users' Association and its willingness to accept aid from any country.

Zhou Enlai and Sultanuddin Ahmed discussed the Kashmir issue and the consequences of the Soviet stance. China also expressed its disapproval with Pakistani involvement in the Manila Treaty, the Baghdad Pact and Islamabad's military agreement with the US.

Ambassador Raza expressed his support for China in the Sino-Indian border conflict, accused India of being two-faced, and talked about how people had misunderstood Pakistan in favor of India in the past.

The two discussed Pakistan's view toward the Sino-Indian conflict. Pakistan sympathized with China and thought that India "deserved to be taught a lesson". Islamabad regarded Nehru as a liar who was ostensibly neutral, anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist but in fact signed secret treaties with the US. Both Chinese and Pakistani representatives agreed to strive to resolve peacefully the border issue between Beijing and Islamabad.

A memorandum from Hugh Montgomery, The Director of Intelligence and Research at the State Department to Ambassador Ronald Spiers discussing Indian and Pakistani nuclear proliferation. The Director details tensions between Pakistan and India, potential actions by India to stop a Pakistani nuclear program, and the influence of outside actors such as the USSR, China, and the United States.

A State Department assessment of Pakistan’s security situation, its nuclear program and the future of Pakistani planning. A range of subjects are covered in depth including, Pakistan’s perception of its security situation, major foreign policy dilemmas such as India and Afghanistan, the development of a “nuclear options” and American non-proliferation responses.

Special National Security Estimate 31-32/81 outlines possible Indian preventative action that could be taken against Pakistan’s nuclear program, and possible responses should Pakistan develop a weapon.