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Documents

1983

The Secret Armenian Army

Report on the Armenian Secret Army's locations across the Middle East, Europe, and other parts of the globe.

January 20, 1966

National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 4-66, 'The Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation'

This estimate updated an estimate (NIE-4-2-64) published in 1964 of the nuclear proliferation problem. That estimate, like this one, overestimated the likelihood of an Indian bomb, while somewhat underestimating Israel’s program. This assessment followed the same pattern—predicting India would produce a weapon within a “few years” and also putting Israel in the “might” category, although treating it as a “serious contender” nonetheless. Also following a short discussion of the “snowball effect” (later known as “proliferation cascades” or “chains”) suggesting that the United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria) and Pakistan were likely to take the nuclear option should India or Israel go nuclear.

March 15, 1973

Cable from Dutch Embassy in Brussels to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'North Korea'

Van Schelle reports that pending the outcome of an investigation the Belgian government has told its Embassy in Warsaw to avoid further contacts with the North Koreans. Furthermore the Belgian Embassy in Bern will look into a presumable visit to Switzerland by a highly placed North Korean and possible motivation of the Swiss to establish a North Korean trade office. The Belgians have reiterated their restrictive standpoint and have no current intention to recognize North Korea

May 26, 1959

Note about a Conversation between the DPRK Ambassador in Berlin Comrade Pak Il-yeong and Comrades Kohrt and Demel on 26 May 1959 at 1500 hours

Discussion on organizational problems with South Korean students in western countries, who intend to live in North Korea, and about German reunifcation.

November 4, 1978

'US Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,' Department of State cable 281962 to US Embassy United Kingdom et al.

U.S. demarche and "non-paper" on Pakistan's attempts to complete the plutonium reprocessing plant and develop nuclear weapons. Sent to 12 countries to ensure that they "exercise vigilance and appropriate control to deter Pakistan from acquiring sensitive facilities."