Search | Wilson Center Digital Archive

Switch to Visualization

Belgium Clear All

Related Resources

Placeholder image for when a places image is not available

Western Europe

Belgium

Placeholder image for when a places image is not available

Western Europe

Italy

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Placeholder image for when a places image is not available

Western Europe

Great Britain

North Atlantic Council Meeting, Lisbon, June 1985

Archivio Andreotti's NATO Series

Satellite image of Western Europe

Western Europe

"The Bundeshaus (Federal Building) in Bonn, West Germany, May 1961. "

Western Europe

West Germany

Nuclear Proliferation

Euromissiles Crisis

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

Italy. Ministry of Foreign Affairs

-

Warsaw Pact

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

Merckelbach, J. P. M. H.

-

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

Italy. Ministry of Defense

-

Pakistani Nuclear History

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

Mitrokhin, Vasili

1922- 2004

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

Scholten, Willem

-

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

United States. Department of State. Bureau of Intelligence and Research

-

Results:

21 - 30 of 42

Display:

Sort By:

Documents

May 10, 1955	Report from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 'Comments on the Asian-African Conference from Capitalist Ruled Countries After the Asian-African Conference' The Chinese Foreign Ministry summarizes (predominantly) Western leaders' statements about the Bandung Conference. Secretary Dulles expressed great satisfaction with the "useful and good conference," especially its role in "checking China," while Great Britain expressed strong disapproval of China's behavior at the conference and France was "shocked" that Algeria was discussed. Israel and Australia expressed regret that they were excluded from the conference.
May 3, 1977	State Department telegram to U.S. Embassy London et al., 'Nuclear Suppliers Meeting, April 28-29, 1977' This document describes the meeting of 15 nuclear supplier states in London where issues were discussed such as full-scope safeguards, including sanctions in the guidelines, purpose of supplier consent, moratoriums, enlargement of membership, and various countries' individual concerns were voiced and addressed.
June 11, 1976	George Vest to the Secretary of State, 'London Nuclear Suppliers Meeting' This document provides an overview of the London Nuclear Suppliers' Meeting which included the addition of the five newest countries to the original seven. Most old and new members were receptive when Washington lobbied them to support a “long term and stable regime of restraint” on the export of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology. While the French were supportive of the moratorium proposal, the Germans were uncomfortable with it, not least because of the implications for their deal with Brazil.
May 25, 1957	Collection of Reports from Polish Military Attaches Around the World Reports from Washington, Ottawa, Cairo, Berlin, Brussells, Rome, Stockholm, and Helsinki discussing events that occurred from January-May 1957. Most of the contents revolved around meetings with other foreign officials and actions of embassy's host country.
February 1985	Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'The Libyan Nuclear Program: A Technical Perspective' For years, U.S. intelligence agencies did not take seriously Muammar Gaddafi’s efforts to develop a Libyan nuclear capability and this report provides early evidence of the perspective that the Libyan program “did not know what it was doing.” According to the CIA, the program’s “serious deficiencies,” including “poor leadership” and lack of both “coherent planning” and trained personnel made it “highly unlikely the Libyans will achieve a nuclear weapons capability within the next 10 years.” The Libyan effort was in such a “rudimentary stage” that they were trying to acquire any technology that would be relevant to producing plutonium or enriched uranium.
January 20, 1966	National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 4-66, 'The Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation' This estimate updated an estimate (NIE-4-2-64) published in 1964 of the nuclear proliferation problem. That estimate, like this one, overestimated the likelihood of an Indian bomb, while somewhat underestimating Israel’s program. This assessment followed the same pattern—predicting India would produce a weapon within a “few years” and also putting Israel in the “might” category, although treating it as a “serious contender” nonetheless. Also following a short discussion of the “snowball effect” (later known as “proliferation cascades” or “chains”) suggesting that the United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria) and Pakistan were likely to take the nuclear option should India or Israel go nuclear.
April 20, 1971	Telegram, Embassy of Hungary in Romania to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry A report of the attempted kidnapping of the Belgian Ambassador, who was mistaken for an American, by North Korean assailants.
March 15, 1973	Cable from Dutch Embassy in Brussels to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'North Korea' Van Schelle reports that pending the outcome of an investigation the Belgian government has told its Embassy in Warsaw to avoid further contacts with the North Koreans. Furthermore the Belgian Embassy in Bern will look into a presumable visit to Switzerland by a highly placed North Korean and possible motivation of the Swiss to establish a North Korean trade office. The Belgians have reiterated their restrictive standpoint and have no current intention to recognize North Korea
May 10, 1955	Report from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 'Comments on the Asian-African Conference from the Participating Countries After the Conference' Description of the reaction to the Asian-African Conference in both participating countries and capitalist ruled countries.
December 10, 1979	Major points from the discussions in Brussels, Rome, London, Washington, Bonn An outline of key points made in each of several meetings over a one week period. Includes the following: the Netherlands and Belgium will try to decide as late and as simultaneously as possible on TNF modernization; Italy will try to help the Dutch influence FRG and U.S. positions; U.K. is committed to helping Dutch cabinet remain intact; FRG does not oppose the Dutch move to delay their decision but also believes Netherlands should not try to block NATO decision-making.