Letter from R. F. "Pik" Botha to the Angolan Minister of the Interior, decrying the movement of SWAPO militants into South African territory and the Angolan anti-South African propaganda campaign. Urges Angola to end the propaganda and to ensure that SWAPO attacks are not planned or executed from Angolan territory.

Description of a meeting between Angolan and South African delegations, the former being led by Venancio De Moura. Details discussion of troop withdrawal from Namibia, focusing on an "outburst" by De Moura.

Chester Crocker writes to R. F. "Pik" Botha about the importance of not responding to the recent Cuban/Angolan communique. Crocker warns against giving the Cubans an excuse to keep their troops stationed in Namibia, and points out that it is likely a distraction for concessions the Cubans and Angolans are about to make to South Africa and the United States.

Message from R. F. "Pik" Botha declaring that, despite SWAPO incursions into Namibia, South African forces have not retaliated, in order to give the maximum amount of time for Angola to make good on its promise to withdraw its forces. South Africa will, however, maintain a military presence in Namibia while he threat is still there.

A defense of Cuban military intervention in Angola, citing the advance of South African troops in Angolan territory as justifiable cause. Accuses the United States and South Africa of inciting bands of Namibian militia to upset the Cuban presence in Angola. Argues that the presence of Cuban troops in Angola is an agreement between two sovereign governments.

Analysis of the military campaign waged in Southern Angola in 1987-88 as well as the lessons learned from this exchange. Document indicates that FAPLA failed to learn from its mistakes, while UNITA adapted much more effectively to the combat environment it faced in Angola. Although FAPLA managed to hold on to Cuito Cuanavale, its large losses led to a Cuban build-up in Southern Angola, which challenged the existing military balance in the region. This provided new impetus to peace negotiations and resulted in the December 1988 Accords among South Africa, Angola and Cuba.

Chinese delegation visits the White House and discusses Angola. The Chinese emphasize that South Africa must exit the conflict if there is to be any chance of rallying other African states to oppose Neto.

CIA station chief in Luanda, Hultslander gives his perspective on the US involvement in Angola. In his interview he explains what the US knew about liberation movements prior to the outbreak of Civil War, his opinion on the CIA covert action program IAFEATURE, the Cuban presence in Angola and his assessment of the leading factions in Angola; MPLA, UNITA and FNLA.

Response to a request made by the South African Defense Forces Chief of Staff to supply UNITA/FNLA. The US believes that UNITA/FNLA are receiving sufficient support to meet their defensive needs.

President Ford is briefed on the situation in Angola and requests possible options that the US could pursue to be made ready.