1893-1976
Eastern Europe
(372) documents
Southern Africa
North America
Middle East
South Asia
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1915- 1983
1931- 2022
1924-
August 30, 1977
In a statement Horwood said that South Africa's nuclear program was for peaceful purposes, but that if it choose to, the country would make the decision to develop weapons "according to its own needs and it alone would make the decision."
January 20, 1966
This estimate updated an estimate (NIE-4-2-64) published in 1964 of the nuclear proliferation problem. That estimate, like this one, overestimated the likelihood of an Indian bomb, while somewhat underestimating Israel’s program. This assessment followed the same pattern—predicting India would produce a weapon within a “few years” and also putting Israel in the “might” category, although treating it as a “serious contender” nonetheless. Also following a short discussion of the “snowball effect” (later known as “proliferation cascades” or “chains”) suggesting that the United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria) and Pakistan were likely to take the nuclear option should India or Israel go nuclear.
September 23, 1993
Report by Director General of the IAEA on the Agency’s verification activities in South Africa and the status of the country's abandoned nuclear weapons program. The report includes an overview of the history of the program.
March 24, 1993
The Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations sends an extract of a speech delivered by South African President F. W. de Klerk announcing developments relating to South Africa’s nuclear capability, the normalization of international relations and accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
September 29, 1987
South African Memorandum on the country's military policy on biological and chemical warfare, and accompanying attachments.
March 30, 1983
CIA report summaries new information on Israel-South African nuclear cooperation. According to the report, South Africa formerly launched its weapons program in 1973, and paused it in 1979 following the international discovery of the Kalahari nuclear test site. Military cooperation between South Africa and Israel is believed to be extensive, with continual contact between personnel and the large-scale sale of arms. Aside from the South African sale of depleted uranium to Israel in the mid-1970s, the CIA had no hard evidence of nuclear cooperation between the two.
May 15, 1981
South African Minister of Foreign Affairs "Pik" Botha and President Reagan meet in Washington, DC. South African Ambassador Sole, the note taker, interprets Reagan's friendly opening comments as "the inference clearly being that he had no illusions about democratic rule in Africa." They discuss the situation in Namibia and Angola, and their shared opposition to Soviet and communist influence in the region. Botha also asks Reagan to help South Africa's souring relations with France regarding nuclear cooperation. Botha states that "South Africa was not preparing or intending to explode a nuclear device, but[...] could not afford publicly to surrender this option."
May 8, 1981
South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs informs its missions in Washington, Paris, London, Bonn about an announcement by F.W. De Klerk, Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs, that under terms agree with the United States and the IAEA, SAFARI I will be operated on locally manufactured fuel.
March 4, 1981
South African Ambassador Donald Sole reports on the possible effect of Reagan non-proliferation policy on South African/US nuclear relations.
January 21, 1979
Forwarded to Ralph Earle, Director of US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on the 22 September 1979 explosion, or Vela Incident, concludes that it was a nuclear explosion.
