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November 2, 1962

Cable no. 346 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

Pavlicek's primary focus in this cable is the effect of the crisis on the national media. The Cuban media is stressing Castro's 5 Points, and some journalists are hesitant to report anything else. There is a slight thread of anticommunism and anti-Soviet sentiment breeding among the media, but these feelings are not widespread, according to Pavlicek. The press is holding off on coverage of all other events such as the Sino-Indian border conflict and Chinese support for Castro's 5 points until after his speech.

November 1, 1962

Cable no. 347 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

The cable from Pavlicek, received a day late, confirms that Castro's wish to not have an international inspection and dismantling of the missile bases went ignored. This sparked a great outrage among the prominent party members in Cuba, including Ernesto "Che" Guevara, who was crushed with disbelief upon hearing the news. The situation is one of general confusion as everyone awaits Castro's appearance, and his 5 Points to be fulfilled.

November 1, 1962

Cable no. 341 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

Pavlicek relays to Prague the results of the meeting between Cuban foreign minister Raul Roa and UN Secretary General U Thant. Thant expressed sympathy for the Cuban people and acknowledged the right for Cuba to submit their considerations for the resolution to the crisis. The Cuban requests included lifting the American blockade, fulfilling Castro's 5 Points, and no UN inspection of the missile bases. Besides the meeting with the Secretary General, Pavlicek also recounts the meeting of a Latin American delegation including representatives from Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay and Mexico. All nations but Mexico refused to give in to U.S. pressures, and stood in support of Cuba. Pavlicek then moves on to cover the possible subjects of Castro's speech on 1 November, including the Cuban detention of anticommunist groups in country and the results of the negotiations with U Thant. In the meantime, the Cuban government is concerned with curtailing the actions of anti-Soviet groups which have sown confusion and discontent among the population.

November 1, 1962

Cable no. 340 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

Public opinion in Havana has soured after the actions of the Soviet Union to resolve the crisis. The press and radio are preparing the ground for Fidel Castro's speech that day, accompanied by a spike in Cuban nationalism. Castro visited a university where he expressed hope of a resolution to the crisis that would not negatively affect Cuba's security.

October 31, 1962

Cable no. 339 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

Pavlicek relates to Prague how Fidel Castro is in a rage over the decision to dismantle the missile bases in Cuba, as he had not been informed. All efforts of the Cuban government are focused on having Castro's 5 Points fulfilled, while explanations from the Soviet Union that Cuba was not abandoned are spreading. The mood among the Soviets is one of crushing defeat, and some of the technicians have given in to drunkeness in a refuge of despair, refusing to cooperate. The situation in Havana appears grave according to Pavlicek.

October 31, 1962

Cable no. 338 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

Pavlicek reports to Prague that the public situation in Cuba is still uncertain and confused. Castro is expected to give a speech the coming Thursday which would resolve the situation and clarify the position of the Soviet Union. There is a lack of depth in evaluation, and much needs to be explained to the Cuban population by the Soviet Union, as all fear aggressive action by the United States.

October 30, 1962

Cable no. 337 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

In Cuba, Castro's 5 Points speech has caused discontent among the populace. According to Pavlicek, this is because the Cuban people and leadership do not understand the steps taken by the Soviet Union and instead believe the Soviets have "backed away" from the USA, resulting in the weakening of Cuban defenses. The perspective the Cuban people are taking is not a global one but a nationalistic one. There is a great sense in unease at the Czechoslovak Embassy as a result of this discontent.

October 30, 1962

Cable no. 336 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

Cable 336 reinforces the notion by Pavlicek that the press is inadequately reporting on the Soviet Union's side of the crisis. The newspaper Revolucion in particular has poor coverage, which has sparked outrage among the Cuban population. The purported reason is preoccupation with other stories and a lack of adequate understanding of the entire crisis.

October 30, 1962

Minutes of Conversation between the Delegations of the CPCz and the CPSU, The Kremlin (excerpt)

In this conversation between Khrushchev and Novotny, Khrushchev used exceptionally candid language to defend his handling of the superpower confrontation, what he described as “six days which shook the world.” While well aware that many fellow communists (including the Chinese and Cubans) regarded his agreement under pressure from US President John F. Kennedy to remove the missiles as a surrender to the imperialists, Khrushchev stoutly defended his action as not only a necessary measure to avoid a catastrophic nuclear war, but actually a victory. Khrushchev bluntly criticized Fidel Castro for failing to comprehend the true nature of war in the thermonuclear age and, that at the height of the crisis, he had suggested in a letter to Khrushchev that the Soviets should be the first to use nuclear weapons, striking the United States should it attack Cuba, even though this would lead promptly to a global war.

October 30, 1962

Cable no. 335 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

Pavlicek reports there is an apparent rift between Cuban Foreign Ambassador Roa and Soviet Premier Khrushchev on the orders to dismantle the missile sites. Roa believes the people will not understand and misinterpret this step by the Soviets, as well as the Soviet Union losing international prestige. Fidel Castro plans to make a speech on public television to clarify the whole situation. Castro also made clear his paranoia about the United States not holding up to their promises and was convinced an invasion was still imminent.

Pagination