A memo to Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi from his foreign policy advisor Antonio Badini about the domestic constraints on Dutch foreign policy.

A letter from Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu to Helmut Kohl. Ceausescu makes some suggestions to ease the Geneva negotiations: the Warsaw Pact could accept “not taking into account the UK and French missiles”: the German government could “postpone the deployment [of the Intermediate missiles] to the end of 1984 or the beginning of 1985”; or the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries should organize a conference “to discuss the issue of the Intermediate Range Missiles”.

A memo to Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi from his Diplomatic Counselor Antonio Badini. Badini warns against the latest Soviet proposals. He suggests that agreeing to them without making any concessions regarding the deployment of American missiles would be tantamount to the realization of a long term goal of the Soviet Union, i.e. the decoupling between the Western European and the American defense system. […] He writes that the Soviet proposals “can be taken as a possible basis for an agreement is surprising. We can
only hope that this fact does not imply that, from a political and psychological standpoint, the process of Finlandization of Europe is far more advanced than we believed thus far.”

This memo expresses the regrets of the Italian government for the failure of the INF negotiations. According to the memo, Italy “committed itself to the normalization of the East – West dialogue” and proposed resuming Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks.

An exhaustive memo on the deployment of the Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Forces from 1977 to 1983.

Description of discussions between Brandt and Mitterrand on European security and strategic balance between the East and West. Topics covered include France's nuclear forces and INF negotiations.

Memorandum of conversation between Italian Prime Minister Frencesco Cossiga and Dutch Prime Minister Andreas van Agt. Cossiga opens the conversation by outlining the Italian government's support for limited TNF modernization and rapid ratification of SALT II. In response and at the behest of his government, van Agt suggests decoupling the INF production and deployment decisions.

U.S. President Jimmy Carter writes to Prime Minister Van Agt about the Dutch proposal to cut NATO's TNF modernization proposal.

Dutch Prime Minister van Agt responds to President Carter's concerns about a Dutch proposal to reduce NATO modernization. He writes that in light of Carter's concern, he will not press the Dutch proposal but that his government remains concerned over the size of the modernization program.

The Dutch Defense Minister outlines opposition to NATO modernization proposals. He specifically mentions that the program seems not to take arms control efforts into account, while erring too high on the side of missile installation. He points out the tremendous political difficulties supporting such a move would have at home. Also included in this collection are short responses from the UK Minister of Defense.