1893-1976
Eastern Europe
(372) documents
South Asia
North America
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East Asia
1892- 1980
1923-
1909- 1966
August 2, 1973
Transcript of questions and answers between members of the Rajya Sabha on the nuclear energy conference in the United States specifically research, educational reactors, technology, social impacts of nuclear power, and others.
June 5, 1951
Roger Makins of the British Foreign Office informs Michael Perrin, Deputy Controller for Atomic Energy, about negotiations between India and the United States and India and France for nuclear cooperation.
November 19, 1966
Packet of material prepared by the Department of Atomic Energy regarding research cooperation with the United States. Includes a letter from Glenn Seaborg, Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, a letter from Myron B. Kratzer, of the Division of International Affairs, and a draft of the research agreement.
August 12, 1996
Report on US Ambassador to India Frank Wisner's meeting with Indian Opposition Leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and halting any nuclear test. The Ambassador found the meeting unproductive. The CTBT was central to the discussion but it was evident that Vajpayee was not interested and his “body language” indicated that he was inclined to favor a nuclear test. During one point in the discussion, Vajpayee asked, “What if we start underground tests?” According to the embassy’s message, “we interpret his question about testing as indicating that [he] and the BJP would favor a test” and would not be persuaded by U.S. arguments—“reason”—to forego one.
December 15, 1995
State Department talking points for analyzing the issue of a potential Indian Nuclear Test. These talking points review the state of play after Ambassador Wisner’s demarche to the Indian Foreign Ministry. Recognizing Prime Minister Rao’s cautiousness, US government officials did not believe that he had made a decision to test, but they were aware that he was under great pressure to do so. Therefore, the U.S. government was working with allies, encouraging them “to urge India not to test.” Parallel discussions were taking place with the Pakistanis over the production of enriched uranium over above the 3 to five 5 percent level that could be used to fuel nuclear reactors. The Pakistanis were denying that they were producing highly enriched uranium but intelligence reports suggested that they were contemplating such action or had already begun the process.
The State Department writes to Islamabad urging Pakistan to not react if in fact India chooses to launch a nuclear test. On 15 December the New York Times published a story by Tim Weiner, under the headline “US Suspects India Prepares to Conduct Nuclear Test.” While some Indian journalists and policy experts were convinced that the story was a US government plant, Weiner had simply used due diligence in pursuing a lead from a non-government expert on nuclear proliferation issues. Worried that the story would exacerbate regional tensions by encouraging Pakistan to “act in a manner that jeopardizes our nonproliferation efforts in South Asia,” the Department wanted to enlist the Chinese to encourage the Pakistanis to “exercise restraint in response to these reports.”
December 11, 1995
Memo from senior scientist at the ACDA, Robert S. Rochlin, discussing the possible serious political and diplomatic consequences of India launching a nuclear test. In the event that Rao had made a decision to test, the United States did not have enough “leverage” to encourage a policy reversal or to prevent a regional arms race; Washington would need to organize a “concerted intervention by all the major states.”
Talking points for Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Hollum from the State Department. Hollum was instructed to “urge” the Japanese to convey their concern to the government of India and “strong opposition [to] any such tests.” The State Department did not want to make any public statements about the situation because that “would be counterproductive,” that is, it would tip the U.S.’s hand Japan to tell Tokyo to voice its concerns over the possible Indian Nuclear Test to New Delhi.
December 10, 1995
Telegram instructing the Charges d'Affairs to arrange an urgent meeting between the United States Ambassador to India and the Indian Prime Minister's Pricipal Secretary to discuss American concerns that India will launch a nuclear test. The State Department was ready for a demarche to the Indian government to express “grave concerns” about the possibility of a test.
May 16, 1956
A series of letters between Dr. Bhabha and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru covering a wide range of subjects, including the appropriate venues to voice opinions, the status of the Colaba site, meeting with the Pakistan Association for the Advancement of Science, and issues with coordination between the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Ministry of Education on scientific research and education. Also includes a copy of a letter from The Tokyo Shimbun requesting Dr. Bhabha’s presence at a forum discussing the justifiability of American hydrogen bomb tests in the Pacific.