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Documents

December 11, 1995

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Memorandum by Robert S. Rochlin, 'Implications of an Indian Nuclear Weapons Test'

Memo from senior scientist at the ACDA, Robert S. Rochlin, discussing the possible serious political and diplomatic consequences of India launching a nuclear test. In the event that Rao had made a decision to test, the United States did not have enough “leverage” to encourage a policy reversal or to prevent a regional arms race; Washington would need to organize a “concerted intervention by all the major states.”

December 11, 1995

State Department Telegram 285472 to US Embassy in Tokyo, 'ACDA Director Hollum’s Meeting with Japanese Officials'

Talking points for Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Hollum from the State Department. Hollum was instructed to “urge” the Japanese to convey their concern to the government of India and “strong opposition [to] any such tests.” The State Department did not want to make any public statements about the situation because that “would be counterproductive,” that is, it would tip the U.S.’s hand Japan to tell Tokyo to voice its concerns over the possible Indian Nuclear Test to New Delhi.

December 10, 1995

State Department Telegram 28705 to US Embassy in India, 'Arrange Wisner-Varma Meeting on Testing Issue'

Telegram instructing the Charges d'Affairs to arrange an urgent meeting between the United States Ambassador to India and the Indian Prime Minister's Pricipal Secretary to discuss American concerns that India will launch a nuclear test. The State Department was ready for a demarche to the Indian government to express “grave concerns” about the possibility of a test.

October 21, 1964

National Intelligence Estimate NIE 4-2-64, 'Prospects for a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Over the Next Decade'

This US analysis of the likelihood of nuclear proliferation during the next decade was finished only days after the first Chinese nuclear test on 16 October. The report analyses the implications of this test, as well as programs in India, Israel, Sweden, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Canada, and others. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) argued that India was the only new state likely to develop nuclear weapons, concluding that “there will not be a widespread proliferation …over the next decade.”

April 23, 1964

Letter from Thomas Hughes, Director, Office of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, to Director of Central Intelligence John McCone

Noting new intelligence information on the Indian and Israeli nuclear programs, as well as the possibility of developments concerning Sweden, Hughes requested McCone to initiate a new estimate of nuclear proliferation trends, which would eventually become part of a October 1964 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). Hughes enclosed draft “terms of reference,” that included questions about the possibility of “clandestine” weapons programs and new technological developments that could make weapons development “easier” (perhaps a reference to gas centrifuge technology that the 1964 NIE would discuss).

June 23, 1963

National Intelligence Estimate NIE 4-63, 'Likelihood and Consequences of a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Systems'

This NIE comes to the general conclusions that “there will not be a widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons over the next 10 years” and discusses programs in various countries (Israel, China, Sweden, India, West Germany, Japan, etc.) This copy includes newly declassified references to the Israeli nuclear weapons program, including the conclusion that “the Israelis, unless deterred by outside pressure, will attempt to produce a nuclear weapon some time in the next several years.”

May 23, 1974

National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 202 on Nuclear Proliferation

Following India’s nuclear weapon test, the US must reassess its nuclear non-proliferation policy and how best to deal with India in the future. The author of the memo determines that nuclear non-proliferation is still necessary and can be “effectively pursued.” The memo is followed by a series of documents outlining courses of action to help deter further proliferation.

1970

Tata Institute of Fundamental Research Annual Report 1945-1970

A report explaining the history of the establishment of the Tata Institute for Fundamental Research, its financial and administrative status, and reports on the progress within a number of fields ranging from chemistry to radio astronomy.

October 24, 1964

Bhabha Speech on Nuclear Disarmament United Nation's Day

A speech delivered by Dr. Bhabha for United Nation’s Day on the subject of nuclear disarmament and general disarmament.

January 1, 1954

Historical Note on Tata Institute of Fundamental Research

A historical note from Dr. Bhabha to the Prime Minister chronicling the history of the establishment and subsequent operation of the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research. Also includes information about the Institute’s administrative functions and relations with the Atomic Energy Commission.

Pagination