Prepared by Edward Hurwitz, a Foreign Service officer and future ambassador then on assignment to INR, this report treated ICBMs as China’s main weapons goal, an eventual means for a “credible threat” to Beijing’s U.S. and Soviet “arch enemies.”

Intelligence reports about recent visits to Beijing by Pakistani defense and science officials raised questions whether China was or would be providing nuclear aid to Pakistan. The latter was already developing close relations with China, a matter which was of great concern to U.S. policymakers, but INR analyst Thomas Thornton concluded that Pakistan was highly unlikely to seek a significant degree of Chinese nuclear assistance.

INR looked closely at Soviet positions on an NPT arguing that the Soviets appeared to “attach a higher priority in using the nondissemination issue as a means of attacking possible NATO nuclear arrangements than in concluding an agreement.”

INR looked closely at Soviet positions on an NPT arguing that the Soviets appeared to “attach a higher priority in using the nondissemination issue as a means of attacking possible NATO nuclear arrangements than in concluding an agreement.”

Statements by Indonesian authorities notwithstanding, INR analysts did not “believe that Indonesia possesses the facilities, personnel and radioactive material necessary for producing an atomic device with any speed.”

With a nuclear nonproliferation treaty under consideration in Washington, INR considered which countries were likely to sign on and why or why not. INR analysts, mistakenly as it turned out, believed it unlikely that the Soviet Union would be a co-sponsor of a treaty in part because of the “international climate” and also because Moscow and Washington differed on whether a treaty would recognize a “group capability.”

The Swedish government rejected Supreme Commander Torsten Rapp’s proposals to fund a nuclear weapons program. This INR report from March 1967 on proposed cuts in defense spending suggested that the possibility that Sweden would acquire nuclear weapons had grown even more remote.

In 1966, Sweden's Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Torsten Rapp, sought funds to support planning to produce nuclear weapons.

In a move interpreted by INR as part of a pro-nuclear “propaganda campaign,” Swedish Supreme Commander Torsten Rapp reportedly asked for funds for to cover the costs of nuclear weapons acquisition.

Only months after China’s first nuclear test in October 1964, INR looked into whether Beijing would help other nations get the bomb.