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July 15, 1987

Department of State, Memorandum from Ted Borek to Mr. Peck [et al.], 'Letter to Justice on Pakistan Export Case'

This draft of a State Department letter to the Justice Department, that was presumably sent soon thereafter, supported prosecution of Pervez to the “fullest extent of the law.”

July 16, 1987

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Memorandum from Norman Wulf, Director to the Director, 'Solarz Amendment Applicability to the Pakistani Procurement Case'

ACDA official Norman Wulf saw a good case, with the information supporting positive answers to basic questions: would the maraging steel to be used for nuclear weapons manufacture, was the Pakistani national working on behalf of his government, would the steel “contribute significantly” to a capability to manufacture a nuclear explosive, and was there an “attempted illegal export”?

July 14, 1987

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Memorandum from Kenneth Adelman to Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 'Your Meeting with Ambassador Merker'

When ACDA director Kenneth Adelman saw the State Department talking points for a conversation with Pakistani ambassador Jamsheed Marker about the Pervez case he was irritated by the “business-as-usual” tone.

July 14, 1987

State Department Telegram 215122 to Embassy Islamabad, 'Maraging Steel Case: Press Guidance'

The Pervez arrest immediately raised questions in the media but the State Department would say little other than: let the legal system do its work, no speculation about Pervez’s intentions, and the admission that the Department had expressed concern to Pakistan about the “overall nature and direction of [its] nuclear program.”

May 29, 1986

Embassy Islamabad Cable 11791 to Department of State, 'Nuclear: Solarz Conversation with GOP'

The year after Congress passed the Solarz amendment in August 1985, Rep. Stephen Solarz (D-CA) traveled to Pakistan, a country that would become a major test case for the amendment which cut off U.S. foreign aid to recipients. Solarz confronted General Zia and other top officials with his perception, based on U.S. intelligence, that Pakistan’s Kahuta plant was enriching weapons-grade enriched uranium. The Pakistanis strenuously denied the charge.

November 22, 1985

Embassy Bonn Telegram 35237 to Department of State, 'Export of Uranium Enrichment to Pakistan'

In response to the State Department's request, the Foreign Office found that the equipment had not been delivered and German firms had been informed that an export license needed to be granted.

September 19, 1985

Department of State Telegram 287763 to Embassy Bonn, 'Export of Uranium Enrichment equipment to Pakistan'

As these telegrams demonstrate, by the fall of 1986, if not earlier, the U.S. government believed that a Pakistani firm, Multinational Inc., was a “procurement agent” for A.Q. Khan’s secret network. In this case, Pakistani agents operating in West Germany were trying to secure aluminum tubes that could be used for the Khan Laboratory’s gas centrifuge program.

October 6, 1990

Correspondence between the MIC and the Petro Chemical Group Regarding a Letter from A.Q. Khan Offering Assistance in Developing Iraq’s Nuclear Weapons Program

Pakistani scientist 'Abd-el-Qadeer Khan offers to help Iraq establish a project to enrich Uranium and manufacture a nuclear weapon.

November 1985

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Research Paper, 'Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Personnel and Organizations'

This heavily excised report on the “well-educated committed cadre” that managed the Pakistani nuclear program demonstrates how the CIA protects its intelligence on Pakistani nuclear activities. This is the same version of the report that can be found on the Agency’s FOIA Web page; the recent version includes no new information. Details on Khan Research Laboratories and the gas centrifuge program are entirely withheld, but some information is made available on the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission and the Directorate of Nuclear Fuels and Materials. The latter includes details on the status and purpose of major projects, for example, the Kundian Nuclear Complex, also known as the Chasma Reprocessing Plant, which was not completed until 1990. For the purposes of producing plutonium for weapons, the Pakistanis were interested in a heavy water moderated reactor of the NRX (National Research Experimental) type that Canada built at Chalk River. In 1985, the Pakistanis started that project in earnest, with construction beginning in 1987 of what became known as Khushab Chemical Plant II.

December 7, 1979

Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment, Central Intelligence Agency, Enclosing Report, 'A Review of the Evidence of Chinese Involvement in Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program'

With nuclear proliferation a policy priority for the Jimmy Carter administration, and Pakistan already a special concern, the possibility that China and Pakistan were sharing nuclear weapons-related information began was beginning to worry US government officials. They had no hard evidence--and the soft evidence that concerned them is massively excised in the December 1979 report just as Beijing and Washington were normalizing relations—so the “precise nature and extent of this cooperation is uncertain.”

Pagination