Rodriguez met with Koucky to clarify misunderstandings which could possibly arise because the reasons were not explained for Cuba’s positions on issues of the international communist movement, and for speeches and statements of some leading Cuban comrade.

Meeting between Raul Castro, Bohumir, Lomsky, and Langer. Castro informed Lomsky that internal danger has been eliminated, and contra-revolutionary and anti-government groups operating directly in Cuba have been broken up and practically destroyed. They evaluated the strategy of the cuba's defense, revised operational plans, and carried out number of changes. They originally approached the CSSR with a plea for a shipment of 200 pieces of 30 mm double cannons. The current situation, however (especially the situation in the DRV), is forcing them to ask for 30 mm cannons again.

Report on visit of Cuban Delegation in Czechoslovakia and conversation on 16 April 1965. This document contains information about visit of the Czechoslovak military delegation in Cuba on 30 March - 9 April 1965. There are attachments to the document: draft of the resolution, the report, report on important conversations in connection with the visit. The visit occurred at the time of heightened acts of aggression of the USA against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and thus it was regarded as highly important in Cuba. It contributed to strengthening of Cs. Cuban friendship and to strengthening of the friendship in arms of our armies.

Hungarian ambassador to Czechoslovakia Lajos Cséby summarizes Deputy Head of the Sixth Main Department [of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs] Stross’s report on relations between Cuba and Czechoslovakia. Stross reports friendly relations between the two countries, which did not experience difficulties during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Stross outlines Cuba’s problems, economically and politically, and believes that Cuba’s revolutionary success depends on its economic growth. Cuba misunderstood the Soviet Union’s approach to the Cuban Missile Crisis. This led to signs of Chinese influence on Cuban politics, which Stross believes are reversing since Castro’s [1963] visit to the Soviet Union.

In a conversation between Kliszko and Raul Castro, a referral was made to the position assumed by the Minister of Industry in Cuba, Ernesto Guevara, at the economic seminar of Afro-Asian countries in Algeria in February 1965. Castro stated that he was not prepared to discuss the essence of the issue, e.g. the extent of aid from socialist countries to developing countries, but he felt Guevara's comments were extreme and out-of-place at the seminar.

The conversation between Castro and Gomulka took place on the initiative of Castro. Parties discussed the following topics: (1) relations between the UPSR and the PUWP, (2) the issue of the legalization of the Cuban Revolution, (3) the Situation in Vietnam, (4) Cuba and the Current Situation in Latin America, (5) the position of the PUWP with regard to the conference of 81 parties, and (6) the attitude of the socialist camp towards Cuba.

During a trip from Orneta to Katowice, Raul Castro and Zenon Kliszko had conversation on the following topics: (1) assessment of the position of the Italian Communist Party, (2)assessment of the position of the Romanian Workers’ Party, (3) the UPSR and other Communist Parties in Asia, and (4) the Matter of a Former Member of the National Leadership UPSR – J. Ordoqui. For the Polish side, the program of the Italian Communist Party is not clear, particularly with regard to the question of establishing a uniform workers’ party.

During his visit in Poland, Castro relates Cuba's position on a conversation taken place in Moscow and why it may be of interest to the Cubans. Gomulka raises the issue of the missiles. In Gomulka's opinion two factors were decisive: contradictions which arose within the socialist camp and the policy which was conducted by Khrushchev. Gomulka is assured that US is capable of conducting a war with Cuba by way of conventional weapons, it does not have to use nuclear weapons. It is clear that the socialist camp and the USSR cannot defend Cuba in any other way but by using nuclear weapons. If a conflict is meant to be, then it will be a nuclear conflict, there is no other way. Gomulka further raises a question whether to go into a nuclear war or not. Castro disagrees with a manner nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Cuba by Soviets. Khruchshev explained that he did not have time. Per Gomulka, Khrushchev conducted a policy which was not thought-out and which was all-out. Gomulka further discusses his talks with Chinese and Vietnamese comrades re: nuclear weapons issue.

A collection of Brazilian ambassadors and ministers gather to meet and discuss the impact of Cuba-US relations on the region in preparation for a gathering of Organization of American States (OAS) foreign ministers scheduled for 22-31 January 1962. The government officials’ primary concerns are to manage the impact of the "Cuban problem" on domestic Brazilian politics and to develop an independent line of thought, without jeopardizing its relationship with the US. The officials want to craft an approach for the OAS meeting that will not cause Brazil to become a mediator between hostile parties nor incite Brazilian public opinion in favor of communism.

Bulgarian Politburo member Boris Velchin reports on a Bulgarian delegation visit to Latin American in late 1969. Liberation movements are characterized by mass participation against imperialism, not socialism. Latin American communist parties have a strong theoretical base, but are weak. Velchev proposes that socialist countries create coordinated economic and political strategies towards Latin American countries and aid the populist movements in their quest for liberation from imperialism. Velchin is interested in collaborating with the Soviet Union, which should coordinate the effort.