This report for the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) pointed to downsides of US and international pressures against pariah or otherwise beleaguered states such as South Africa and Israel and against would-be nuclear proliferants. They might cooperate to advance their goals.

Seeking “constructive engagement” with the apartheid regime, the Reagan administration wanted the South Africans to keep a lid on their nuclear weapons program. The NIE’s top-secret status was compatible with one of the elements of the 1984 estimate: that any revelations that broke the regime’s “calculated ambiguity” about its nuclear status would put Washington in an “awkward position” by “fir[ing] the drive” for the sanctions and disinvestment campaigns which the administration was trying to avoid. Analyzing the motives for the nuclear program, the CIA found it “irrelevant” to any threat that the regime was likely to face.A key issue was whether South Africa had a nuclear arsenal. On that problem, the NIE dovetailed with the view taken by NIE-4-82: South Africa “probably has the capability to produce nuclear weapons on short notice.” That was accurate, but U.S. intelligence may not have known that the regime’s leaders had already decided to build a stockpile of 7 weapons, with six weapons assembled during the 1980s.

With South Africa’s status as a pariah state, its nuclear program was a thorny problem for a series of U.S. presidents. In August 1977, the Carter administration, working with the Soviet Union, lodged protests against South Africa’s apparent preparations for a nuclear test, forcing a shut-down of the Kalahari test site if not the entire nuclear program itself. Indeed the CIA’s analysis of South Africa’s innovative “aerodynamic” uranium enrichment plant at Valindaba brought it to the conclusion that South Africa would be able to produce enough weapons-grade uranium “to make several nuclear devices per year.”

UK Ambassador to South Africa Sir David Scott conveys the text of a letter he sent to South African Defense Minister P. W. Botha about UK concern that South Africa is developing a nuclear weapon.

Reid of the UK's Central and Southern African Department describes a recent visit to Pretoria, South Africa, during which he heard supposedly non-nuclear explosions taking place at the Kalahari Desert facility.

In a statement Horwood said that South Africa's nuclear program was for peaceful purposes, but that if it choose to, the country would make the decision to develop weapons "according to its own needs and it alone would make the decision."

Report by Director General of the IAEA on the Agency’s verification activities in South Africa and the status of the country's abandoned nuclear weapons program. The report includes an overview of the history of the program.

The Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations sends an extract of a speech delivered by South African President F. W. de Klerk announcing developments relating to South Africa’s nuclear capability, the normalization of international relations and accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

South African Memorandum on the country's military policy on biological and chemical warfare, and accompanying attachments.

Alarmed that South Africa may be capable of developing nuclear weapons, the IAEA calls upon South Africa to submit its nuclear facitilies to agency safeguards, and calls upon all IAEA member states to hault nuclear cooperation with South Africa.