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August 1, 1961

Summary of Comments by N. S. Khrushchev concerning the Question of the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty with the German Democratic Republic

Khrushchev remembers the signing of peace agreement with Japan and the exclusion of the Soviet Union from it. He criticizes the politics of Adenauer and warns about the destructive effects of potential world war. Khrushchev suggests signing the peace agreement to avoid the possibility of a nuclear war against the US and its allies

July 5, 1961

Record of a Conversation between N. S. Khrushchev and Chen Yi, Deputy Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China

Chen asks Khrushchev to go over the pressing international issues and he presents the USSR's stances on the situation in Laos, South Korea, and Cuba. Khrushchev also raises problems in GDR and difficulties in negotiations with Western powers with regards to the German question. Khrushchev also mentions Soviet plans to launch a spaceship and resume nuclear testing. The two leaders also discuss the challenges of agricultural development.

August 3, 1961

Khrushchev's Speech at the Opening of the Meeting of Moscow Conference, 3-5 August 1961

Khrushchev makes the opening statement to the secretaries of the CC's of Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries at a conference in Moscow. The purpose of the conference is to discuss the preparation and conclusion of a German peace treaty.

October 30, 1961

Letter from Ulbricht and the SED CC Delegation to the CPSU 22nd Congress in Moscow to Khrushchev

Representing the SED CC delegation, Ulbricht writes to Khrushchev requesting a meeting with the CPSU CC presidium, for which he outlines the topics necessary for discussion. Topics include the West Berlin question and the need for an agreement between Western powers and the USSR, and a treaty between the GDR and West Germany to establish territorial sovereignty.

January 30, 1961

Letter from Khrushchev to Ulbricht, in Response to Ulbricht's Previous Letter Regarding a Peace Treaty

Khrushchev writes to Ulbricht discussing negotiations with Kennedy and other Western powers with both German states.

July 21, 1971

Memorandum for President Nixon from Kissinger, "Berlin Negotiations: The Unresolved Issues"

National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger updates President Nixon on the status of the Four Power Berlin negotiations between the Soviet Union, East Germany, West Germany, and the United States, focusing on unresolved issues on which the four states were unable to agree.

April 5, 1971

Memorandum for President Nixon from Kissinger, "The Berlin Negotiations - New Guidelines"

National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger updates President Nixon on the status of the Four Power Berlin negotiations between the Soviet Union, East Germany, West Germany, and the United States.

February 16, 1970

Memorandum for President Nixon from Kissinger, "Brandt's Eastern Policy"

A memorandum for President Nixon from National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger summarizing West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's "Ostpolitik" or Eastern Policy, which sought to normalize relations between West Germany and the communist countries.

August 3, 1961

Walter Ulbricht's Speech at the Moscow Conference, 3-5 August 1961

Ulbricht speaks at the Moscow Conference of Secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries for the Exchange of Opinions on Questions Concerning the Preparation and Conclusion of a German Peace Treaty.

September 25, 1953

Draft Instructions to Chuikov and Semyonov

In March 1953, Moscow had declined Ulbricht’s request for tightening up the sector border in Berlin, then the major loophole in the SED leadership’s efforts to seal off East Germany. In the aftermath of the demonstrations and unrest in Berlin, the SED leadership apparently tried to reintroduce the idea of increased “border security” in Berlin. Eager to salvage whatever was left of its political position as a champion of German unity, Moscow again held such measures as politically “disadvantageous” and “unacceptable.” Certainly, the Kremlin was also aware of the continued widespread resentment among the Berlin and GDR population which made any more restrictive measures a risky undertaking. Instead, the Soviets urged the SED to increase its “fight against hostile elements” in West Berlin—an issue that would become more and more the focus of Soviet attitude on Berlin.