Barbara Tobias, scientific attaché to the US embassy in Brasília, visited the Brazilian Foreign Ministry to discuss Brazil’s inclusion in the list of countries subjected to a rigorous system of exports control (“validated license”). Tobias explained that the decision was not made by consensus and that it was largely a demand of the American Congress.

This cable, sent from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington to Brasília, reports Brazil’s inclusion in the list of countries that might manufacture rockets. The inclusion was in the supplement number 6 section 778 of the “Export Administration Regulations.” The US administration’s report on the list also notes the importance of the Brazilian government’s recent steps towards non-proliferation and that its inclusion in the list is due to its rocket programs and the development of its SLV.

This cable reports the outcome of the visit made by the Missile Technology Control Regime's mission to Brazil headed by Reginald Bartholomew, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs. Throughout the meeting, the Brazilian space program was described as the most sensitive issue in regard to the MTCR.

This letter sent by President Fernando Collor to President George H. W. Bush describes the importance of the first Brazilian made satellite to the country and communicates that the French-American consortium Orbital Sciences Corporation will probably be the enterprise chosen to put the Brazilian satellite in orbit. President Collor expected that this partnership paved the way for further cooperation in the space field and informed President Bush of his decision to create the Brazilian Space Agency (AEB), under civilian control.

This is a letter written by Brazilian Congressman Herbert Levy which reveals the content of his meetings with high U.S. governmental officials regarding his concern about Argentina’s nuclear activities less than a year after the Falklands/Malvinas War. In these conversations, Levy states that Argentina might develop a nuclear artifact.

The SNIEs from 1983 and the 1985 update emphasize Brazil’s quest for technological-industrial autonomy which in nuclear terms meant developing an indigenous program to master the fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities. In seeking those objectives, Brazil did not want to face any constraints, and its leaders were unresponsive to US or other pressures for safeguards on nuclear facilities. According to the 1985 report the prominent role of the military in nuclear activities, “the direction of Brazil’s nuclear r&d,” and the CNEN president’s “reputation of favoring a nuclear option” posed a “danger to US interests in Brazil.”

Report of a meeting between President Geisel and his top nuclear advisors on the eve of President Carter’s visit to Brazil and Geisel’s trip to West Germany. Issues discussed include: the delay in the construction of the Angra I, II and III nuclear plants; the unreliability of the US and Urenco (mainly due to Dutch reticence) as suppliers of nuclear fuel; the rising costs of the German deal; and the dissatisfaction with the jet nozzle enrichment technology and the possibility of renegotiating with Germany for the purchase of ultracentrifugation technology. Both Foreign Minister Silveira and President Geisel admitted the possibility of acceding to the NPT if necessary to get the technology.

Confidential report identifying major trends regarding uranium supply. The document assesses US capacity to supply nuclear fuel after 1980, and describes European initiatives to manage the fuel cycle. The document underscores the convenience of defining guidelines, which “might ensure Brazilian leadership in Latin America” (p.105); then, it outlines the difficulties inherent to the establishment of a bilateral agreement with the US (taking into account the Brazilian position vis-à-vis the NPT), and suggests Europe (most notably West Germany) as a potential partner. The document recommends the establishment of a confidential working group formed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Mines and Energy in order to set up a strategy that would allow for the establishment of a nuclear cooperation agreement with the partner country, at the time still undefined.

On the eve of the trip of American Secretary of State George Shultz to Brazil, the American officer responsible for the Brazilian desk at the Department of State conveys to the Argentine Embassy in Washington that the United States would appreciate an initiative toward the implementation of a system of mutual inspections or a joint declaration in which both countries would renounce the development of a nuclear device, the same two points proposed by American Congressman Paul Finley in 1977.

Brazilian Foreign Minister Guerreiro and American Secretary of State Alexander Haig meet in Washington D.C. Haig illustrates a shift in American nuclear policy from that of the Carter administration to a more lenient approach.