1893-1976
Eastern Europe
(372) documents
Western Europe
-
North America
United States
1911- 2004
May 1, 1961
In the use of nuclear weapons for a purpose other than response to an attack, NATO members must reach a majority agreement rather than a unanimous vote. Furthermore, this majority vote must include the United States.
This letter outlines the problems NATO faces as relations between member and non-member countries are complicated by conflicting interests. Not only is NATO struggling externally to play the field between free and communist countries in forming its alliances, but also internally to reconcile the different objectives of imperialist and non-imperialist countries and form a cohesive defense strategy.
August 23, 1961
Italian official Pinna Caboni summarizes the military report delivered by General Norstad regarding the threat of attack on Berlin, evidenced by the presence of Soviet troops near the city. According to General Norstad, immediate action must be taken to mitigate the threat of nuclear attack on Berlin in the interests of Germany as well as all of Western Europe.
May 2, 1961
Document announcing the official abandonment of the policy of massive retaliation as a "deterrence" strategy. Opinion of the Italian senior minister of defense regarding the need for a more flexible NATO defense strategy in order to respond to any type of act of aggression is also presented.
April 28, 1961
Report of the head of the Italian defense department’s recent trip to the United States. Of importance was the discussion of NATO’s long-term plan (ten to fifteen years), the strategic defense of the Balkans, the maintenance of the United States’ NATO forces in Europe, and the need to push development of conventional weapons to avoid having to employ nuclear weapons.
April 27, 1961
Letter recounting a meeting between the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the British Foreign Secretary regarding NATO’s weapons development. Nuclear weapons should never be employed unless absolutely necessary and instead serve as an intimidation tactic to deter Soviet aggression. The necessity of increasing NATO’s arsenal of conventional weapons to match that of the Soviets was also stressed.
April 8, 1961
Description of NATO’s new directives for the 1961-1962 year, as they were presented by President Kennedy. NATO has decided on a comprehensive defense strategy which includes increasing the nuclear capabilities of submarines, airplanes, and long-range missiles while developing new non-nuclear weapons.
April 1, 1961
Report submitted to the Italian Minister of Defense regarding President Kennedy’s opinion that NATO should not construct a special nuclear force since the US has already developed a nuclear deterrent. According to the Kennedy, the creation of an additional deterrent would be useless and a waste of resources.
March 22, 1961
Letter expressing Germany’s opinion that the defense of Europe is impossible without using nuclear weapons as an intimidation tactic and horror at the United States’ suggestion that Europe can defend itself with conventional weapons alone. Defense of Germany should be NATO’s top priority because if Germany falls, the rest of Europe falls. The letter also references NATO’s difficulty in developing a cohesive strategy because each country is too concerned with protecting its own territories and assets.
March 15, 1961
Letter from the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs analyzing President Kennedy’s State of the Union Address. Despite stating his commitment to cooperating with NATO, the minister suspects that Kennedy has other priorities. The letter suggests that if the Kennedy expresses hesitancy in creating a nuclear force, European nations including Italy will move forward with or without American support.
