Stalin agrees with Mao Zedong that North Korea is not yet ready to launch an assault, and reports that the Soviet Union has told North Korea to concentrate on developing liberated areas and guerrillas in South Korea.

Pak Seong-cheol claims that the American forces in South Korea are a hindrance in the way of reunification and comments on Soviet-North Korean relations and Japan.

Message to Vyshinsky that U.S. proposals for a ceasefire should not be accepted as they are negotiating from a position of weakness after several defeats.

Message from Stalin to Zhou Enlai agreeing with Chinese conditions for a ceasefire and advising that the Chinese limit negotiations on a ceasefire until Seoul is liberated.

The Soviet Union sends a set of questions to Kim Il Sung on about the South Korean army and North Korea's war plans.

Shtykov gives an insider’s report of a meeting with Kim Il Sung and Pak Heon-yeong, in which they discussed the current desperate state of the KPA, possible advancement of the US forces over the 38th parallel and the extent of the enemy’s knowledge of Soviet Union deliveries to North Korea. Kim asks for advice concerning the appeal for military aid that the Political Council of the Worker’s Party of Korea plans to send to Stalin. Shytkov comments on the nervousness and desperation of the Korean officials.

Soviet responses to the American installation of Japanese servicemen in Korea.

Telegram from Gromyko to Zhou Enlai advising the latter to turn down the invitation for China to participate in the UN Security Council. It also explains the circumstances under which the invitation was obtained.

A letter to IOC President Samaranch from Ambassador Kun Park regarding the Soviet, Cuban and North Korean governments' positions on the 1988 Summer Olympics.

A message from Gromyko to Stalin relaying the assessment of Shtykov that it would be prudent for the Soviet Union to withdraw some nonessential embassy personnel and specialists from North Korea. Gromyko advises that withdrawals should be considered only in consultation with North Korea and the appropriate Soviet ministeries.